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 1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On trial for capital murder in Harris County, Texas3 in June of 
1983, Calvin Burdine was represented by Joe Cannon, an experi-
enced criminal defense attorney.4 Burdine was accused of murdering 
W.T. “Dub” Wise during a robbery. Both Douglas McCreight and 
Burdine were accused of committing this crime.5 Although the evi-
dence indicated that McCreight was the primary actor during the 
crime, the State of Texas entered into a plea arrangement with 
McCreight for which McCreight served an eight year prison sen-
tence.6 At Burdine’s trial, Cannon performed in a fashion that, ap-
parently, was not unusual for him7—by sleeping through “substantial 
portions” of his client’s trial,8 including occasions where the prosecu-
tor was questioning witnesses.9 Cannon dozed with his chin on his 
chest, his head bobbing up and down during the proceeding.10 He 
had a particular affinity for napping during the afternoons of both 
the guilt/innocence and punishment phases of Burdine’s trial.11 
Cannon slumbered anywhere from a few seconds to about ten min-
utes at a time,12 and when he awoke, he often darted his head up 
suddenly and appeared quite startled.13 
Of course, the record of Burdine’s trial cannot possibly indicate 
precisely when Mr. Cannon was asleep or awake or what trial hap-
penings Cannon observed or missed because he was asleep. How-
 
 3. The city of Houston, Texas is located in Harris County. Houston is noted by at 
least one scholar as being “the capital of capital punishment. Houston sends more people to 
death row than most states.” See Stephen B. Bright, Will the Death Penalty Remain Alive in the 
Twenty-First Century?: International Norms, Discrimination, Arbitrariness, and the Risk of Exe-
cuting the Innocent, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1, 15. 
 4. Burdine’s was not Cannon’s first representation of a capital case. Cannon had repre-
sented others, including Carl Johnson in 1979 when Johnson was convicted of capital murder. 
See Burdine v. Johnson, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854, 859 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
 5. Id. at 855 n.1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. at 858 (quoting testimony given by the trial judge’s clerk, Rose Marie Berry, 
who testified at the state district court evidentiary hearing that she “knew that [Cannon] had 
this problem [of sleeping while representing criminal defendants at trial]”). 
 8. Ex parte Burdine, Cause No. 37944-B (183d Dist. Ct. Harris County, Tex. Apr. 3, 
1995). 
 9. Burdine, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 857. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. at 858. 
 13. Id. 
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ever, it was established that he missed “substantial portions” of the 
case against Calvin Burdine.14 Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
jury convicted Burdine of capital murder and sentenced him to 
death. What is surprising is that when Burdine complained of his trial 
counsel’s inexcusable behavior to Texas’s highest court of criminal 
appeals, the court summarily held that, although Burdine did prove 
that Cannon slept through substantial portions of Burdine’s capital 
murder trial, Burdine had not proven that he received ineffective as-
sistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.15 It was not 
until over sixteen years later that a divided court agreed with Burdine 
that the lawyering he received at his capital murder trial was constitu-
tionally inadequate.16 Although ruling in Burdine’s favor, the court 
did so over strong and vociferous dissent.17 
Calvin Burdine’s case is unique only insomuch as he was ulti-
mately afforded relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.18 
 
 14. See Ex parte Burdine, Cause No. 37944-B (183d Dist. Ct. Harris County, Tex. Apr. 
3, 1995). 
 15. See Burdine, 66 F. Supp. at 856 (quoting the one-page, unsigned opinion of the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stating that “‘the trial court’s findings of fact [regarding the 
sleeping of trial counsel] are supported by the record,’ but summarily proceeded to hold that 
Burdine ‘is not entitled to relief because he failed to discharge his burden of proof under 
Strickland v. Washington.’”). In a similar case, a trial judge in whose court a defense attorney 
slept during a capital trial explained that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel was not violated because the Constitution does not require a criminal de-
fense lawyer to be awake. See Stephen B. Bright, Casualties of the War on Crime: Fairness, Re-
liability and the Credibility of Criminal Justice Systems, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413, 419–20 
(1997) (discussing the trial of George McFarland, a defendant sentenced to die after his capital 
murder trial in Houston). 
 16. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 357 (5th Cir. 2001). The first panel of Fifth 
Circuit judges to hear Burdine’s appeal was divided in ruling that Burdine’s legal representa-
tion did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950 
(5th Cir. 2000). 
 17. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 357–401 (5th Cir. 2001). In ruling on Bur-
dine’s appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, issued four separate opinions. 
One of the dissenting judges noted that “Burdine’s counsel actually provided competent repre-
sentation throughout the course of the trial” and that the “‘sleeping lawyer’ claim [was] in 
large part [just] a diverting tactic.” Id. at 357 (Jolly, J., dissenting). Another dissenting judge 
wrote that the court’s decision “must not be influenced” by the spectacle of Burdine’s lawyer 
sleeping though the trial. Id. at 356. “In focusing so narrowly and intently on Cannon’s sleep-
ing, the majority has lost sight of the reasons for the Sixth Amendment’s requiring effective 
assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding . . . .” Id. (Barksdale, J., dissenting). Burdine’s 
case has been appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but the Court has not yet decided 
whether to grant certiorari. See “Sleeping Lawyer” Case Not Ready for Bed Yet, HOUS. CHRON., 
Jan. 28, 2002, at A15. 
 18. See infra Part III.A.3 (explaining that petitioners rarely prevail in bringing ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims). 
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What is not unique about his case is the deplorable legal representa-
tion that he received. There are a multitude of cases that reveal legal 
representation of criminal defendants as something that can be de-
scribed as nothing less than “poor lawyering.”19 Unfortunately, this 
phenomenon occurs more often than our legal system may care to 
admit.20 
Evaluating the legal system as a whole, there are essentially three 
levels21 on which to assess poor lawyering: the constitutional level, 
the civil level, and the disciplinary level.22 Each of these levels has dif-
ferent mechanisms for evaluating the conduct of criminal defense at-
torneys: (1) on the constitutional level, by means of an ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim;23 (2) on the civil level, by means of a 
criminal malpractice claim;24 and (3) on the disciplinary level, by 
means of a disciplinary action against the attorney.25 Unfortunately, 
the existence of this three-level system of safeguarding has done little 
to promote respectable criminal defense lawyering and has done even 
less to encourage the continued improvement of the criminal defense 
bar. Although unsettling, it is intellectually easy to explain why 
criminal defense lawyering is lacking: (1) ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are difficult to win;26 (2) criminal malpractice claims 
are even more difficult to win;27 and (3) referrals to appropriate dis-
ciplinary bodies are both infrequent and unsuccessful.28 
 
 19. See infra notes 36–38 and accompanying text (citing examples of poor lawyering). 
 20. In fact, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the author of the landmark ineffective assis-
tance of counsel case, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), discussed infra Part 
III.A.1, recently acknowledged that criminal defendants often receive inadequate legal repre-
sentation. See Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, O’Connor Questions Fairness of Death Penalty: 
Justice Rethinking the Laws She Shaped, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 2001, at N1. 
 21. Use of the term “level” is not meant to suggest the existence of some hierarchical 
relation. Rather, I use the term as a means of describing the differing paths or courses of action 
available to criminal defendants who have complaints concerning their legal representation. 
 22. Poor lawyer performance may constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Additionally, poor lawyer performance, although not necessarily constitutionally in-
firm, may be regarded as professional negligence. Finally, poor lawyer performance that, al-
though not necessarily constitutionally infirm or poor enough to constitute professional negli-
gence, may violate applicable ethical requirements and, thus, be appropriate for discipline by 
the applicable agency. See infra Part III.A–C. 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. See infra Part III.B. 
 25. See infra Part III.C. 
 26. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 27. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 28. See infra Part III.C. 
1DUN.DOC 3/23/02  11:34 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
6 
As they currently exist, the “safeguards” at the constitutional, 
civil, and disciplinary levels provide little monitoring of the criminal 
defense bar. Left unwatched, there is little incentive or hope of im-
proving the quality of criminal defense lawyering. After detailing a 
few examples of poor lawyering in Part II,29 Part III of this article 
examines the “safeguards” currently in place at each level and dis-
cusses how the existence of these “safeguards” may erroneously lead 
one to believe that the system is actively monitoring criminal defense 
lawyering.30 Part III.A examines the constitutional level and the dif-
ficulties inherent in bringing a successful ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.31 Part III.B evaluates the difficulties that a criminal 
defendant may encounter at the civil level in bringing a successful 
criminal malpractice claim against his lawyer.32 Part III.C considers 
the current inadequate use of the disciplinary process as a means of 
monitoring the conduct of criminal defense attorneys.33 Part IV 
suggests how the legal system may begin to monitor the conduct of 
criminal lawyers more effectively, an undertaking that will improve 
the quality of criminal defense lawyering generally.34 These changes 
should include abolishing the collateral estoppel effect of an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim to bringing a criminal malpractice ac-
tion; abolishing the actual innocence prerequisite to bringing a 
criminal malpractice claim; permitting a criminal defendant to file an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and a criminal malpractice 
claim jointly; encouraging trial judges to be more conscientious in 
reporting and documenting poor criminal defense lawyering that 
they witness in their courts; and implementing an automatic referral 
system whereby lawyers accused of providing incompetent represen-
tation are routinely referred to the appropriate disciplinary body. 
Our system as it currently exists does a poor job of monitoring the 
conduct of criminal defense lawyers. Creating a system that has in  
 
 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part III (discussing the existing safeguards against poor criminal defense 
lawyering). 
 31. See infra Part III.A (discussing the constitutional safeguard against poor criminal 
defense lawyering). 
 32. See infra Part III.B (discussing the civil safeguard against poor criminal defense 
lawyering). 
 33. See infra Part III.C (discussing the disciplinary safeguard against poor criminal de-
fense lawyering). 
 34. See infra Part IV. 
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place meaningful safeguards will necessarily improve the legal repre-
sentation that criminal defendants receive. 
II. UNCONSCIOUS, INEBRIATED, AND OTHERWISE  
INCOMPETENT LAWYERING 
As puzzling as it may seem at first glance, arguably the most vul-
nerable of all clients—criminal defendants—too often run the risk of 
being subject to the worst that the legal profession has to offer.35 
Sadly, the conduct about which Calvin Burdine complained is not as 
rare as it should be.36 Neither is bad lawyering a new phenomenon.37 
 
 35. That is not to suggest that all criminal defense lawyering is poor. To the contrary, 
many fine lawyers practice criminal defense. However, at least two reasons help explain why 
this segment of the bar, as compared to other segments of the bar, has the potential to have 
more occurrences of what can only be characterized as poor lawyering. First, the conduct of 
criminal defense lawyers is largely left unmonitored, a fact that is the subject of this article. 
Second, clients of criminal defense lawyers are often individuals who are indigent or otherwise 
unable to pay the costs of increasingly high legal expenses. The quality of lawyering that one 
receives often directly correlates to one’s economic situation. See generally Stephen B. Bright, 
Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 
YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) (explaining that the quality of a capital defendant’s legal representation 
is directly related to the defendant’s economic condition). 
 36. Unfortunately, claims of sleeping lawyers are not as uncommon as they should be. 
See, e.g., Courtney v. United States, 708 A.2d 1008, 1011–12 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (ruling that 
defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer only slept through 
insignificant portions of his trial); Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 1996) (involv-
ing a defense attorney who slept every day of his client’s criminal trial, sleeping through a criti-
cal prosecution witness and during damaging testimony presented by a co-defendant); 
McFarland v. Texas, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505–06 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that al-
though one of defendant’s two lawyers, a 72-year-old experienced attorney, took short naps 
during the afternoon sessions of the trial, defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of 
counsel); Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 833–34 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that defen-
dant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney slept through substantial 
portions of his trial); United States v. Muyet, 994 F. Supp. 550, 560–63 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (rul-
ing that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when both the defendant 
and attorneys for his co-defendants testified that the defendant’s attorney slept frequently 
throughout the trial); United States v. Reyes, No. 90 Cr. 584 (CSH), 1991 WL 95395, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1991) (ruling that although attorney may have slept through portions of 
criminal defendant’s trial, defendant could not establish under Strickland that his attorney’s 
performance was deficient or that his case was prejudiced as a result); Halverson v. State, 372 
N.W.2d 463, 466 (S.D. 1985) (holding that an attorney who admitted during hearing for 
post-conviction relief that he had slept during the plea agreement did not provide ineffective 
assistance of counsel); Villarreal v. State, No. 01-98-00858-CR, 2000 WL 190208, at *3 (Tex. 
App. Feb. 17, 2000) (ruling that defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel 
even though his attorney may have slept through the majority of the testimony of the arresting 
officers and that his counsel’s failure to cross-examine and object during that testimony is mere 
speculation of prejudice to his case); Bright, supra note 15, at 420–21 (noting that sleeping 
lawyer cases and cases involving other forms of poor criminal defendant representation are not 
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Although it is true that the majority of clients in the majority of cases 
are represented by adequate lawyers, instances of clients being repre-
sented by lawyers who, for whatever reason, are inept at the time of 
the representation occur more frequently than our system should 
tolerate.38 Consider, for example, the representation of Perry 
 
unique to Harris County, Texas but, rather, that equally shocking examples can be found 
throughout the country). 
 37. Incidents of poor lawyering have been reported in case law for many years. See, e.g., 
Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941) (finding that defendant’s attorney 
was drunk and asleep at various times throughout the criminal trial); United States v. Butler, 
167 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Va. 1957) (alleging that morphine-addicted attorney fell asleep several 
times throughout the criminal defendant’s trial); State v. Keller, 223 N.W. 698, 699–700 
(N.D. 1929) (involving a criminal defendant represented by a lawyer who was so intoxicated 
that he did not know what was transpiring at all times in the courtroom, who failed to examine 
the jury for cause, did not put any witnesses on for the defense, and made no argument to the 
jury); O’Brien v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W. 666, 669 (Ky. Ct. App. 1903) (involving a defen-
dant convicted of murder represented by a lawyer who was so drunk throughout trial that, for 
example, at the time the case was to be argued before the jury, the arguments had to be post-
poned by the court to the next day). 
 38. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. For recent examples, see Burnett v. 
Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 930 (5th Cir. 1993) (involving a defendant convicted of aggravated 
robbery after being represented by attorney who allegedly smelled of alcohol during defen-
dant’s trial and entered a facility for treatment of alcohol abuse after the trial); Bellamy v. Cog-
dell, 974 F.2d 302, 303–04, 309 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that an attorney’s admitted physical 
and mental incapacity prior to trial, that resulted in immediate suspension from the practice of 
law based on incompetency after the trial, did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); 
McDougall v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 518, 534–35 (4th Cir. 1990) (involving a situation where one 
of defendant’s attorneys, who had his law license suspended multiple times, was being treated 
for depression and suffered from migraine headaches so severe during his representation of de-
fendant for capital murder that he had to visit local emergency rooms at least nine times during 
trial and take large quantities of medication that may have caused mental confusion and a 
hangover); Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving a defendant convicted of 
murder while represented by an attorney who abused illegal drugs and suffered from alleged 
insane delusions that resulted in erratic and bizarre behavior and representation at trial); Berry 
v. King, 765 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving a defendant convicted of capital murder 
while represented by an attorney who abused illegal drugs); Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489 
(11th Cir. 1984) (involving a defendant convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death 
while being represented by an attorney with an admitted drug problem); Fowler v. Parratt, 682 
F.2d 746 (8th Cir. 1982) (involving a defendant convicted of embezzlement charges while 
being represented by an attorney who admitted to being an alcoholic and who suffered from 
blackouts during the representation); Bonin v. Vasquez, 794 F. Supp. 957 (C.D. Cal. 1992) 
(holding that defendant was not denied ineffective assistance of counsel despite the fact that his 
lawyer was addicted to drugs); Pilchak v. Camper, 741 F. Supp. 782 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (in-
volving a defendant convicted of drug and weapons charges after being represented by a lawyer 
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease at the time of trial); Hernandez v. Wainwright, 634 F. 
Supp. 241 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (finding that an attorney who was allegedly an alcoholic and im-
paired by alcohol during defendant’s trial did not render ineffective assistance of counsel); 
Pugach v. Mancusi, 310 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (involving an attorney allegedly suffer-
ing from mental illness who became so disoriented and confused at times throughout the de-
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Bellamy. In the mid- to late-1980s, after almost fifty years in the pro-
fession, attorney Sidney J. Guran retired from practicing law.39 At 
seventy-one years of age and under the care of a physician, Guran’s 
health was declining.40 His doctor diagnosed him as suffering from 
polyneuropathy, a neurological problem characterized, among other 
things, by peripheral motor weakness, unsteadiness on one’s feet, 
and an inability to concentrate.41 In January of 1986, Perry Bellamy’s 
mother retained the ailing Guran, in spite of his medical problems, 
to defend her son against murder charges.42 Although Guran had 
been retired from the practice of law for over a year, Guran agreed to 
the representation, a decision based in part on the fact that he had 
represented Perry numerous times in the past.43 
Several months later, in October of 1986, in an action unrelated 
to Bellamy’s murder case, the Departmental Disciplinary Committee 
for the First Judicial Department (the “Committee”) filed charges of 
professional misconduct against Guran.44 Less than a month after be-
ing contacted by the Committee regarding the disciplinary charges, 
Guran’s attorney sent a letter to the Committee in which he stated 
that Guran was mentally incapable of defending himself before the 
Committee and requested that the disciplinary proceedings be ad-
journed due to his client’s compromised mental state.45 Enclosed 
with the letter to the Committee was a letter from Guran’s doctor 
indicating that treatment of Guran’s medical conditions would take 
 
fendant’s trial that after each incident, the court made an informal inquiry of the attorney in 
the robing room and learned that the attorney suffered from mental fatigue); Haney v. State, 
603 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (finding one of defendant’s attorneys in contempt of 
court for appearing while drunk at criminal defendant’s capital trial); People v. Garrison, 765 
P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (involving a defense attorney in a capital murder trial 
who was an alcoholic at the time of the representation and who subsequently died from the 
disease); State v. Coates, 786 P.2d 1182, 1186–87 (Mont. 1990) (involving an attorney who 
used cocaine during defendant’s representation). 
 39. See Bellamy, 974 F.2d at 303. 
 40. Id. at 303–04. 
 41. Id. at 303. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Bellamy v. Cogdell, 952 F.2d 626, 627 (2d Cir. 1991), vacated by 974 F.2d 302 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (en banc). The Departmental Disciplinary Committee for the First Judicial De-
partment is the body responsible for pursuing disciplinary charges against attorneys within that 
jurisdiction. The Committee investigated Guran for professional misconduct in connection 
with an accusation of alleged conversion of funds. Bellamy, 952 F.2d at 627. 
 45. Id. 
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between three and six months and that during that time Guran 
would be mentally incapacitated.46 One month later, the Committee 
petitioned for Guran’s indefinite suspension from the practice of law 
while at the same time moving for an order immediately suspending 
him from practicing.47 
In response to the Committee’s request of an immediate suspen-
sion, Guran attested, in sworn affidavit, that although the allegations 
of his physical and mental incapacity were in dispute, he should be 
permitted to represent Bellamy in his murder trial scheduled for the 
following month.48 In requesting permission to help in Bellamy’s 
representation, Guran stated that he would not try the case by him-
self but wanted to be available to assist a “competent attorney.”49 
Guran promised not to take any cases other than Bellamy’s.50 The 
Committee granted his request. 
Bellamy’s trial took place approximately one month later. In spite 
of his agreement with the Committee, Guran represented Bellamy 
without any trial assistance from additional counsel.51 The jury pro-
nounced Bellamy guilty of murder on January 24, 1987.52 In March 
1987, the Committee unanimously suspended Guran from the prac-
tice of law in order “to protect the public” because, as Guran con-
ceded, he was incapable of practicing law.53 
Bellamy knew nothing of these developments until after he was 
convicted by the jury. At his sentencing hearing for the murder con-
viction in April 1987, Bellamy, who had just learned of his lawyer’s 
suspension, was sentenced to fifteen years to life.54 Being his first op-
portunity to do so, it was at the sentencing hearing that Bellamy 
complained that Guran had been unfit to represent him properly at 
his murder trial due to Guran’s mental condition. Bellamy’s claims 
 
 46. Id. at 627–28. 
 47. Id. at 628. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Bellamy, 952 F.2d at 628. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Although there was talk of Guran having attempted to acquire co-counsel, the re-
cord indicates that Guran may have never so intended. Guran lacked the funds to hire co-
counsel because the retainer received from Bellamy’s mother had long been spent. See Bellamy 
v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 312 (2d Cir. 1992) (Feinberg, J., dissenting). 
 52. Bellamy, 952 F.2d at 628. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Bellamy was sentenced to fifteen years to life for the murder conviction and five to 
fifteen years for a criminal weapon possession conviction. Id. 
1DUN.DOC 3/23/02  11:34 AM 
1] (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys 
 11 
went unheeded until he appealed to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals. The majority of the panel agreed that Bellamy had been de-
nied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the United 
States Constitution.55 In so concluding, the panel reversed the lower 
court’s denial of his request for habeas corpus based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel, ruling that “this is one of those rare instances 
where denial of effective counsel must be presumed as a matter of 
law, without any showing of prejudice.”56 
In an acrimonious dissent, Judge Altimari disagreed.57 Although 
Judge Altimari described Guran’s inability to prepare for his own 
disciplinary hearing as “slightly . . . troublesome,”58 Judge Altimari 
was of the opinion that such facts were “simply an insufficient basis 
upon which to conclude that Guran was not competent to defend 
Bellamy at the time of trial.”59 When Bellamy’s case was reconsidered 
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en banc, the majority 
of the court agreed with Judge Altimari and denied Bellamy relief.60 
Although Guran’s lawyer, Guran’s doctors, and Guran himself, as 
well as the state agency charged with policing the competence of lo-
cal attorneys, declared that Guran was incompetent to practice law in 
the jurisdiction and was unable to defend himself in the disciplinary 
matter, the court in Bellamy held that Guran was constitutionally 
competent to defend another, namely, Perry Bellamy, against murder 
charges. 
III. EXISTING “SAFEGUARDS” AGAINST POOR  
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERING 
There are essentially three levels at which the conduct of a crimi-
nal defense attorney may be evaluated: (1) the constitutional level, 
where a criminal defendant has the right to bring an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim based on the Sixth Amendment right guaran-
teeing assistance of counsel; (2) the civil level, where the criminal de-
fendant has the right to pursue a criminal malpractice action against 
 
 55. Id. at 626. 
 56. Id. at 627. 
 57. See id. at 631 (Altimari, J., dissenting). 
 58. Bellamy, 952 F.2d at 635 (Altimari, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. (Altimari, J., dissenting). 
 60. See Bellamy, 974 F.2d 302, 308–09 (2d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (vacating the opinion 
of the panel in a 7-6 decision and affirming the judgment of the district court denying and 
dismissing Bellamy’s petition for writ of habeas corpus). 
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his lawyer; and (3) the disciplinary level, where the lawyer about 
whose conduct a criminal defendant might complain may be subject 
to disciplinary proceedings. Each of these levels represents independ-
ent courses of action that criminal defendants may pursue in order to 
complain of poor lawyering. Each course of action has its own pro-
cedures and remedies that, in theory, are not affected by the other 
available courses of action.61 
The existence of these three independent courses of action pro-
vide the appearance that the legal system is actively monitoring 
criminal defense lawyering. This multi-tiered system suggests that 
the criminal defense bar has at least three independent opportunities 
to be put on notice regarding acceptable standards of conduct and 
that violation of those standards will lead to penalties for noncompli-
ance. Under such apparently watchful eyes, the expectation is that 
the behavior of the criminal defense bar will necessarily endeavor to 
improve. The hope and promise is that criminal defendants are con-
scientiously shielded from poor lawyering as a matter of course. Un-
fortunately, hopes and promises quickly fade upon careful inspection 
of each of these potential courses of action. A close look reveals that 
these supposed protections actually afford little refuge to criminal de-
fendants. More troublesome still is the fact that the imposition of 
sanctions on their egregiously deficient attorneys is even less com-
mon. In fact, these existing “safeguards” are so tragically inadequate 
that representations such as Calvin Burdine’s and Perry Bellamy’s are 
both inevitable and, on an intellectual level, easy to explain. 
A. The Constitutional “Safeguard” Against 
Poor Criminal Defense Lawyering 
The first level at which the conduct of a criminal defense attor-
ney may be monitored is the constitutional level.62 The Sixth 
Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial” and, at that 
 
 61. But see discussion infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the possible effect of an unsuccessful 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on a potential criminal malpractice action). 
 62. Americans often consider the United States Constitution as providing the greatest 
protection from any unjust or egregious behavior that may threaten a citizen’s right to be free 
from unwarranted imprisonment. For example, the Fifth Amendment guarantees, in part, that  
no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. 
CONST. amend V. 
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trial, “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”63 Over the 
years, many criminal defendants who have received inadequate legal 
representation have sought refuge in the Sixth Amendment’s guaran-
tee of the assistance of counsel.64 In our country’s history, the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel has come to 
connote not just the presence of counsel on behalf of the criminal 
defendant, but rather the effective assistance of counsel.65 Presently, a 
criminal defendant who believes that he has received representation 
falling below the constitutional guarantee of the Sixth Amendment 
can pursue what is known as an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. However, in its current form, an ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim protects criminal defendants from only the most egregious 
shortcomings of their lawyers.66 Moreover, even in that narrow class 
of cases, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are inordinately diffi-
cult to win.67 
1. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims: Strickland v. Washington 
Strickland v. Washington68 is the preeminent ineffectiveness case 
decided by the United States Supreme Court. In 1976 in the state of 
Florida, David Washington stood trial for capital murder.69 At his 
trial, he was represented by an experienced criminal defense lawyer.70 
In lieu of having a jury determine Washington’s guilt or innocence 
of the crimes charged, Washington pled guilty to three charges of 
capital murder.71 Because Washington’s counsel felt a sense of hope-
lessness about Washington’s case, at the sentencing phase of his 
 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 64. Cf. Bright, supra note 35, at 1866 (describing the right to counsel as essential to the 
criminally accused). 
 65. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
 66. See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical 
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 93 (1995) (discussing 
how, “contrary to its rhetoric in Strickland,” the Supreme Court has seriously undermined the 
right of indigent accused to have reasonable counsel); see also Bright, supra note 35, at 1857–
66 (explaining that the Constitution does not require a criminally accused to be represented by 
able or effective counsel and describing this most fundamental of rights as receiving the least 
protection under the Constitution). 
 67. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 68. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 69. Id. at 672. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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trial—the phase of the proceedings at which the judge was called 
upon to decide whether Washington would be sentenced to life in 
prison or to death—the attorney failed to present character witnesses 
to testify on behalf of Washington although many were available, 
failed to request a psychiatric examination, and failed to present ex-
culpatory evidence concerning Washington’s character and emo-
tional state at the time he committed his crimes.72 Washington was 
sentenced to death.73 
After his case was affirmed on direct appeal,74 Washington sought 
collateral relief in the Florida state courts, claiming that, inter alia, he 
had received ineffective assistance of counsel.75 Washington based his 
claim on the deficiencies of his counsel at the sentencing phase.76 
Specifically, he complained that his lawyer’s failure to request a psy-
chiatric report, failure to investigate and present character witnesses, 
failure to seek a pre-sentence investigation report, failure to present 
meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge, and failure to inves-
tigate the medical examiner’s reports or cross-examine the medical 
experts at the sentencing hearing prevented the judge from consider-
ing that Washington may have been chronically frustrated and de-
pressed by his economic circumstances at the time.77 Although this 
consideration would not have resulted in a finding that Washington 
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
at the time, Washington contended that it would have provided evi-
dence in mitigation of his sentence.78 
The Florida state courts denied his requests for relief.79 Washing-
ton next filed for habeas relief in the federal courts. The federal trial 
court, based primarily upon the reasoning of the state courts that 
had entertained Washington’s previous appeals, held that there was 
not a likelihood or even a “significant possibility” that any of Wash-
ington’s counsel’s errors had affected the outcome of the sentencing 
proceeding.80 In other words, the federal trial court ruled that, al-
 
 72. Id. at 673. 
 73. Id. at 675. 
 74. See Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981). 
 75. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 675. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 675–76. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 675. 
 80. See id. at 678–79. 
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though Washington’s counsel may have made errors, the state court 
judge would have sentenced Washington to death even absent coun-
sel’s errors and, therefore, there was no basis for relief.81 
On appeal, Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit, now the Eleventh 
Circuit, sitting en banc, granted Washington’s request for relief and 
remanded the case to the trial court.82 The State then appealed that 
ruling and filed a petition for writ of certiorari that was granted by 
the United States Supreme Court; a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel based on a violation of the Sixth Amendment had not previ-
ously been considered by the Court.83 
On behalf of the Court, Justice O’Connor described the consti-
tutional right to be enjoyed by all criminal defendants: 
The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of 
counsel because it envisions counsel’s playing a role that is critical 
to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An 
accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained 
or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is 
fair.84 
Because counsel’s role is not merely pro forma, “the Court has 
recognized that ‘the right to counsel is the right to the effective as-
sistance of counsel.’”85 Judging any claim of ineffectiveness with an 
eye on ensuring that the defendant received a fair trial as its guide, 
the Court announced that “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim 
of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined 
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot 
be relied on as having produced a just result.”86 To do so, Justice 
O’Connor explained that lower courts are to consider two issues: (1)  
whether counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) whether coun-
sel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.87  
 
 
 81. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 678–79. 
 82. See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
The court remanded the case in order for the district court to consider Washington’s case 
based upon the Eleventh Circuit’s newly announced standard of evaluation for ineffectiveness 
claims. See id. at 1263. 
 83. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683. 
 84. Id. at 685. 
 85. Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 687. 
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a. Strickland’s deficiency prong. Regarding the deficiency deter-
mination, the Court advised that the proper measure of evaluating an 
attorney’s performance “remains simply reasonableness under pre-
vailing professional norms.”88 In an opinion issued the same day as 
Strickland, the Court ruled that there may at times exist “circum-
stances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of liti-
gating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”89 In such cir-
cumstances, prejudice to the defendant’s case is presumed. The 
Court gave two examples of when such prejudice is presumed: (1) 
where the accused is completely denied the assistance of counsel and 
(2) where defense counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s 
case to meaningful adversarial testing.90 In making this determina-
tion, reviewing courts are to be “highly deferential” in scrutinizing 
trial counsel’s conduct.91 In fact, reviewing courts are to “strongly” 
presume that the complained-of conduct falls within reasonable pro-
fessional norms and “the defendant must overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be con-
sidered sound trial strategy.’”92 
b. Strickland’s prejudice prong. Regarding the second prong or 
prejudice determination, the Court emphasizes that “[t]he purpose 
of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a de-
fendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the out-
come of the proceeding.”93 With that in mind, the Court determined 
that a finding of prejudice “requires showing that counsel’s errors 
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable.”94 To do so, the defendant “need not show 
 
 88. Id. at 688 (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association 
standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only 
guides.”). Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel, “the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to 
improve the quality of legal representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance 
to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair 
trial.” Id. at 689. 
 89. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (footnote omitted). 
 90. See id. at 659. 
 91. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 92. Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 
 93. Id. at 691–92. 
 94. Id. at 687. The Court did rule that in rare circumstances prejudice may be pre-
sumed, such as where the criminal defendant was actually denied counsel altogether or where 
the defendant’s attorney was burdened by an actual conflict of interest. See id. at 691–93. 
However, absent those limited circumstances, the petitioner is required affirmatively to prove 
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that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the out-
come in the case,”95 but rather that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different.96 The Court defined “reasonable 
probability” as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.97 In other words, the relevant inquiry is whether, ab-
sent the errors, the factfinder would have had reasonable doubt with 
respect to the defendant’s guilt.98 Additionally, similar to the first 
prong’s presumption of reasonable attorney performance, the Court 
instructed reviewing courts to indulge a strong presumption that the 
outcome of the petitioner’s proceeding is reliable.99 
c. Applying Strickland’s two-prong test. After Strickland, in order 
to prevail at bringing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim the 
petitioner must affirmatively prove both deficient performance and 
prejudice.100 The petitioner’s claim fails if the Court finds either 
prong lacking: 
[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance 
claim to approach the inquiry in the same order [set forth in the 
opinion] or even to address both components of the inquiry if the 
defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a 
court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was defi-
cient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a 
result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . If it is easier to dispose of an 
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, 




prejudice. See id. at 693. 
 95. Id. at 693. 
 96. See id. at 694. 
 97. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Court based its test for prejudice on the test for 
materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution. Id. (cit-
ing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 112–13 (1976)). 
 98. Id. at 695. If one is challenging one’s death sentence, as was Washington’s case, the 
legally relevant inquiry is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the 
sentencer would not have sentenced the defendant to death. Id. 
 99. See id. at 696. 
 100. Although Strickland is a capital case, the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry 
fashioned by the Court is the same when applied in noncapital contexts as well. See, e.g., Nix v. 
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 101. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
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However, after announcing the appropriate two-prong test to be ap-
plied in determining all ineffectiveness claims, the Court emphasized 
that the principles it established in Strickland should not be inter-
preted as establishing mechanical rules.102 Rather, the Court stressed, 
“[i]n every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite 
the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular pro-
ceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial proc-
ess that our system counts on to produce just results.”103 
2. The ineffectiveness of  Strickland 
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari to entertain the is-
sue of a criminal defendant’s right to receive the effective assistance 
of counsel, there was initially great cause for hope and enthusiasm. 
Unfortunately, any thoughts of optimism were fleeting.104 The un-
fortunate aftermath of Strickland is that a criminally accused’s right 
to the effective assistance of counsel does not have much substance 
to it at all.105 The Strickland court announced that the Sixth 
Amendment’s purpose is not to grade a criminal defense attorney’s 
performance or to improve the quality of legal representation gener-
ally.106 However, even though the Court professed to fashion a test 
that would lead to the just review of ineffective assistance of counsel  
claims, it is doubtful whether ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
are currently justly reviewed.107 
 
 102. Id. at 696. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Cf. Bright, supra note 35, at 1860 (“[O]ne cannot help but wonder what progress 
has been made since the Supreme Court held that there is a right to counsel in capital cases in 
Powell v. Alabama.”). 
 105. See Geimer, supra note 66, at 94–95 (“Strickland has been roundly and properly 
criticized for fostering tolerance of abysmal lawyering.”); see also Bright, supra note 35, at 1859 
(indicating that much less than mediocre lawyering passes muster under Strickland in death 
penalty cases); Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1259 (1986) (discussing how the Strickland decision effectively emasculates the 
Sixth Amendment). 
 106. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 697; see also Bright, supra note 15, at 420 (opining 
that the difficulty of a criminal defendant obtaining relief under the Sixth Amendment “speaks 
volumes about the [criminal justice system’s] lack of commitment to fairness”). 
 107. See Geimer, supra note 66, at 97–106 (evaluating the facts of Powell v. Alabama 
under the Strickland standard and concluding that had Strickland been already decided, the 
appellants in Powell would have lost: “the possibility that the actual performance of [the 
Scottsboro attorneys] might be constitutionally sufficient today demonstrates graphically the 
magnitude of Strickland’s destructive legacy”). 
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Indeed, as a result of Strickland, it is more accurately stated that 
criminal defense lawyering has in fact been weakened in several as-
pects, affording criminal defendants little, if any, constitutional pro-
tection from bad lawyering.108 First, the Strickland court encourages 
reviewing courts not to speak of incompetent legal representation in 
many situations, thereby eliminating an opportunity for courts to 
discuss and put defense lawyers on notice regarding unacceptable 
lawyering activities.109 Second, the Court set in place strong pre-
sumptions that unnecessarily favor poor lawyering conduct.110 Fur-
ther, as a result of Strickland, an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim is essentially rendered a viable claim available only to the truly 
innocent criminal defendant.111 Finally, a Strickland challenge re-
quires the cooperation of the attorney about whom the petitioner 
complains.112 Any one of these reasons individually makes bringing a 
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim—even where one re-
ceived deplorable legal assistance—an arduous task. Taken together, 
they make Strickland challenges exceedingly difficult to win.113 In 
fact, as explained below, these reasons together contribute to the re-
ality that the vast majority of ineffective assistance of counsel claims  
 
 
 108. See Bright, supra note 15 (discussing the criminal justice system’s lack of commit-
ment to the Sixth Amendment’s promise of a right to counsel). 
 109. See infra Part III.A.2.a. 
 110. See infra Part III.A.2.b. 
 111. See infra Part III.A.2.c. 
 112. See infra Part III.A.2.d. 
 113. There are far too many examples of egregious defense lawyering that have passed 
constitutional muster. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that 
attorney’s admitted physical and mental incapacity prior to trial that resulted in immediate sus-
pension after the trial did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); Smith v. Ylst, 826 
F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that attorney who smoked marijuana and who was appar-
ently mentally ill before and during the trial, as evidenced by the fact that he argued paranoid 
theories of the case to the jury that were never developed at trial, was found to have provided 
effective assistance of counsel despite the fact that the presiding judge noted the attorney’s er-
ratic behavior and the attorney’s associate, private investigator, legal secretary, his client, and 
others testified to the attorney’s mental delusions and erratic behavior); Hernandez v. Wain-
wright, 634 F. Supp. 241, 249–50 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that an attorney who spoke only 
English did not render ineffective assistance of counsel even though he was unable to commu-
nicate with his Spanish-speaking client, who was convicted of murder and armed robbery, dur-
ing pre-trial meetings because the court found no nexus between the language barrier and the 
requisite deficiency of performance and prejudice required by Strickland); see also Coates v. 
McCormick, 5 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision) (holding that an attor-
ney who used cocaine during the representation did not provide defendant with ineffective 
assistance of counsel pursuant to Strickland). 
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are denied even when the claims concern deplorable legal assis-
tance.114 
a. Considering prejudice before performance disserves the legal pro-
fession. At the outset, a subtle—yet admittedly difficult115—problem 
presented by Strickland is the Court’s express pronouncement that 
courts reviewing ineffectiveness claims need not even reach the issue 
of deficient performance if it can be established that the alleged error 
had no effect on the judgment received:116 
Although we have discussed the performance component of an in-
effectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no 
reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to ap-
proach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both com-
ponents of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient show-
ing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether 
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice 
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . . 
If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 
lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course 
should be followed.117 
The Court’s expectation was right—many ineffectiveness cases 
are dispensed with based on lack of prejudice to the defendant’s case, 
without discussing counsel’s deficient performance.118 Encouraging 
the disposition of ineffectiveness claims without a discussion of defi-
cient performance provides a disservice to legal professionalism. 
Strongly inviting the judiciary—some of the most influential mem-
bers of the legal profession—not even to speak of poor lawyering is 
 
 114. See Martin C. Calhoun, Comment, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-
Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 414–
16 (1988) (discussing the fact that ineffective assistance of counsel claims rarely succeed). 
 115. I say that it is a difficult problem because it is well established that courts should 
refrain from rendering advisory opinions. I recognize that to ask courts to speak of something 
that will not ultimately affect the disposition of the case—such as speaking of deficient per-
formance in the face of no prejudice—is not helpful to the task at hand of considering the ef-
fectiveness of the legal counsel to the case at bar. As such, it is unnecessary and advisory. How-
ever, I believe that commentary by reviewing courts of lawyering conduct serves the useful 
purpose of shedding light on acceptable or unacceptable criminal defense lawyering. 
 116. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
 117. Id. (emphasis added). 
 118. See, e.g., Keller v. Larkins, 251 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying ineffective assis-
tance of counsel relief by finding no prejudice without discussing counsel’s alleged deficient 
performance); United States v. Caggiano, 899 F.2d 99 (1st Cir. 1990) (same); United States 
v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1987) (same). 
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unfortunate119 and ultimately harmful to the legal profession.120 Ac-
knowledging and criticizing poor lawyering benefits the profession 
inasmuch as it provides the profession with examples of lawyering 
that are unacceptable and makes it clear that such shoddy perform-
ances will not be ignored or glossed over. 
b. Strickland’s strong presumptions are unreasonably burdensome. 
The presumptions that the Court put in place in Strickland make it 
very difficult for an ineffective assistance of counsel claimant to pre-
vail.121 In order to prevail, the petitioner must overcome two sepa-
rate presumptions: (1) the strong presumption that his lawyer’s con-
duct was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance 
and (2) the strong presumption that the outcome of the proceeding 
is reliable. In other words, a Strickland petitioner does not start on 
level ground in establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Rather, the Strickland petitioner starts in a hole of sorts and is re-
quired to climb out of that hole by overcoming each of these pre-
sumptions in order to reach level ground.122 After overcoming the 
strong presumptions, the petitioner must still go further in order to 
prove that he was constitutionally harmed. 
It is unreasonable to presume that a person convicted of a crimi-
nal offense and now complaining of ineffective assistance of counsel 
 
 119. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 713 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (opining that “little will be 
gained and much may be lost” by the majority’s opinion in Strickland). 
 120. Cf. Bright, supra note 35, at 1879–80 (“[L]awyers must continue to bear witness to 
the shameful injustices which are all too routine in capital cases. The uninformed and the indif-
ferent must be educated and reminded of what is passing for justice in the courts.”). 
 121. Cf. id. at 1862 (“In applying Strickland, courts indulge in presumptions and as-
sumptions that have no relation to the reality of legal representation for the poor, particularly 
in capital cases.”). 
 122. The majority’s opinion describes the presumptions as “strong” and “heavy,” sug-
gesting that a defendant must do more than simply meet the burden of proving his ineffective-
ness claim. As Justice Marshall commented in his dissent: 
The range of acceptable behavior defined by “prevailing professional norms,” 
seems . . . sufficiently broad to allow defense counsel the flexibility they need in re-
sponding to novel problems of trial strategy. To afford attorneys more latitude, by 
“strongly presuming” that their behavior will fall within the zone of reasonableness, 
is covertly to legitimate convictions and sentences obtained on the basis of incompe-
tent conduct by defense counsel. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 713 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). However, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the Strickland standards should not establish mechanical rules. The 
primary consideration should be whether “the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable 
because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just 
results.” Id. at 696. With this primary consideration in mind, certainly a heavy and strong pre-
sumption that a lawyer’s conduct was reasonable is inappropriate. 
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received reasonable assistance. It is unreasonable to presume that the 
outcome of a convicted criminal’s proceeding was reliable when he is 
before a court complaining about his lawyer’s conduct at that very 
proceeding. To do so is to presume the very thing about which the 
petitioner complains. To presume so is to presume too much. The 
existing presumptions make the Strickland petitioner’s burden far 
too heavy. However, that is not to suggest that it would be reason-
able to presume that the petitioner received inadequate representa-
tion either. Rather, it is merely to suggest that there should be no 
presumption either way. 
The historical bases for these presumptions are intriguing, as it is 
unclear upon what bases such presumptions are premised.123 The re-
sult of applying these presumptions can, at times, be odd as well. 
When a client has a lawyer who is, at a minimum, awake, attentive, 
and unimpaired, the Strickland Court presumptions makes some 
sense. However, in truly bizarre cases—such as where one’s lawyer is 
seriously impaired or unconscious during the representation due to 
drug or alcohol use—one should have a viable ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim without having to climb out of a hole and prove 
that seriously impaired or unconscious lawyering falls outside the 
realm of reasonable assistance.124 For example, there are critical dif-
ferences between a conscious lawyer and one who is not.125 A lawyer 
 
 123. See Calhoun, supra note 114, at 427 (suggesting that the Court’s decision granting 
such great deference to trial counsel was made because the Court was overly concerned with 
judicial economy and attorney reputation while being unconcerned about the competence of 
criminal defense lawyers). 
 124. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425 
(1996) (discussing the rare sleeping counsel cases and suggesting that in such circumstances 
prejudice be presumed). 
 125. It should go without saying that a deceased person—who when alive was a lawyer—
propped up in counsel’s chair throughout one’s trial cannot provide adequate representation. 
See David L. Bazelon, The Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 GEO. L.J. 811, 818–19 
(1976) (“[T]he sixth amendment demands more than placing a warm body with a legal pedi-
gree next to an indigent defendant.”). Indeed, representation by a deceased lawyer is, in fact, 
no representation at all. In unconscious lawyer cases, the question must then become whether 
an unconscious lawyer should be strongly presumed to be more akin to a deceased lawyer who 
is physically present during a criminal defendant’s trial or an awake but poor lawyer. Certainly, 
the unconscious lawyer is more like the dead one. The fact that, following Strickland, reason-
able minds can differ on this issue is astounding. But see, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 
336, 396 (5th Cir. 2001) (Barksdale, J., dissenting) (“The majority maintains such an uncon-
scious attorney is no different from one who is physically absent. The flaw in its analysis is that 
it assumes . . . that [the sleeping lawyer] was always so deeply and soundly asleep that he was 
always ‘unconscious.’”); see also Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, supra note 124, at 474 (“In order for 
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who is both present and conscious is available and able to exercise his 
or her judgment, be that judgment for better or worse.126 A lawyer 
who is both present and conscious is able to consider the wide and 
varying range of strategies and tactics available, even if that lawyer 
does not exercise use of such strategies and tactics prudently.127 A 
client whose lawyer was seriously impaired or unconscious during his 
legal proceeding should not have to overcome the strong presump-
tions that he received reasonable legal assistance and that the out-
come of his proceeding is reliable. 
Regarding the presumption against deficient performance, the 
Strickland Court explicitly stated that the prevailing norms of ac-
ceptable behavior are reflected in the various professional standards 
in place in the various jurisdictions, but the Court also stated that 
those standards are only to be guides in determining what is reason-
able behavior for a lawyer.128Such a ruling is understandable if the 
Court is seeking to avoid unnecessary federal interference with State 
regulation of its own bar.129 However, the Court’s pronouncement 
essentially provides that the constitutionality of lawyers’ conduct is to 
be guided by the actual conduct of the profession itself. The Court 
stated that acceptable conduct of lawyering pursuant to the Sixth 
Amendment relies “on the legal profession’s maintenance of stan-
dards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption that counsel will ful-
fill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions. 
The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reason-
ableness under prevailing professional norms.”130 This says nothing 
 
the right to counsel to have meaning, the person representing the defendant must do more 
than just breathe.”). 
 126. See Kirchmeier, supra note 124, at 466 (“The evil lies not in what counsel did, but 
in what counsel could have done had he or she been alert.”). 
 127. See id. (describing actions by unconscious counsel as clearly not strategic). 
 128. See Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). This hardly seems appropriate. Criticiz-
ing Strickland in the specific arena of capital offenses, one scholar writes: 
There is no basis for the presumption of competence in capital cases where the ac-
cused is represented by counsel who lacks the training, experience, skill, knowledge, 
inclination, time, and resources to provide adequate representation in a capital case. 
The presumption should be just the opposite—where one or more of these deficien-
cies exist, it is reasonable to expect that the lawyer is not capable of rendering effec-
tive representation. 
Bright, supra note 35, at 1863. 
 129. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 189–90 (1986) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). 
 130. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (citation omitted). “The debilitating ambiguity of an 
1DUN.DOC 3/23/02  11:34 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
24 
more than that lawyer conduct is to be evaluated by what lawyers do. 
As such, it is not helpful.131 
It is true that criminal defense lawyers should be afforded wide 
latitude in making tactical decisions regarding trial strategy and that 
care should be taken not to impinge unnecessarily upon States’ in-
terests in regulation of their own bar.132 However, it must also be 
possible to fashion some objective constitutional standards that pro-
vide a floor below which effective lawyering should not fall.133 
c. Strickland claims are reserved for the innocent. Strickland v. 
Washington effectively renders an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim a privilege of the innocent.134 The Strickland Court ruled that 
 
‘objective standard of reasonableness’ in this context is illustrated by the majority’s failure to 
address important issues concerning the quality of representation mandated by the Constitu-
tion.” Id. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 131. It is doubtful that the Court would determine the constitutional standards of an 
alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable search and sei-
zure provision by using existing police department practices as a guide. Moreover, would the 
Court, in determining whether the police acted reasonably, rule that a presumption—much 
less a strong presumption—should be placed in favor of a police officer’s conduct in a Fourth 
Amendment context? Most assuredly not. See HAZARD, KONIAK, AND CRAMPTON, THE LAW 
AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 49 (3d ed. 2000) (teacher’s manual). But that is precisely what 
the Strickland Court does, explicitly providing that a strong presumption be placed in favor of 
a criminal defense lawyer’s conduct. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“[A] court must indulge 
a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable profes-
sional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the cir-
cumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”) (quoting Mi-
chel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). Although I agree with the Court that there is a 
wide range of acceptable lawyer conduct, to presume that a lawyer acted acceptably if the law-
yer did not violate any internally created rules is nonsense. And to go further by placing the 
burden of overcoming that strong presumption on the criminal defendant goes too far. See id. 
at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s efforts are unhelpful . . . [and not] likely to 
improve the adjudication of Sixth Amendment claims.”). 
 132. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–90 (discussing the fact that there are countless ways 
in which a criminal defense attorney may defend a case and that the same conduct that may be 
deficient in one setting may be brilliant in another). But “[t]o tell lawyers and the lower courts 
that counsel for a criminal defendant must behave ‘reasonably’ and must act like ‘a reasonably 
competent attorney’ is to tell them almost nothing.” Id. at 707–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted). 
 133. See id. at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that there are many aspects of a 
criminal defense attorney’s job that are amenable to judicial oversight). This is a very important 
issue that I hope to consider in greater detail in the future, as it is beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. 
 134. “[T]he assumption on which the Court’s holding rests is that the only purpose of 
the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to reduce the chance that inno-
cent persons will be convicted.” Id. at 711 (Marshall, J. dissenting). See Calhoun, supra note 
114, at 428–34 (describing the Strickland standard as having a “guilty anyway” attitude). 
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an attorney’s poor performance prejudices a defendant’s case in a 
constitutionally meaningful way only when the decision reached by 
the trier of fact would likely have been different absent the attorney 
errors.135 Although in Strickland the petitioner’s claim concerned his 
attorney’s conduct at the sentencing phase of his trial,136 outside the 
capital sentencing context the prejudice inquiry is essentially the 
same. When a defendant complains of counsel’s errors during the 
guilt/innocence phase of a proceeding, reviewing courts consider 
whether the defendant would not have been convicted of the offense 
absent counsel’s errors.137 
Establishing Strickland prejudice is a difficult task for the peti-
tioner who is actually innocent of the offense of conviction,138 and it 
is an even more daunting task for the convicted defendant who actu-
ally committed the offense of conviction. The obvious consequence 
is that the “guilty anyway” defendant, the defendant who likely 
would not have been acquitted of the charged offense even with ade-
quate representation, will have serious difficulty in bringing a 
 
 135. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. But cf. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 
(1984). In Cronic, the Court stated that the Sixth Amendment was implicated when a defen-
dant was challenging the reliability of the trial process itself, as opposed to challenging the reli-
ability of the result, as discussed in Strickland. Id. 
 136. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing the factual background of Strickland). 
 137. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that although 
criminal defendant was represented at his murder trial by a seventy-two year old attorney 
whose license had recently been suspended because attorney was suffering from admitted 
physical and mental incapacity prior to defendant’s trial, defendant did not receive ineffective 
assistance of counsel, based in part on the fact that the jury considered evidence of guilt and 
deliberated for five days before convicting defendant); King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462, 
1464–65 (11th Cir. 1984) (granting defendant relief for ineffective assistance of counsel be-
cause, inter alia, unlike the “clear guilt” of the defendant in Strickland, here the defendant may 
not have been guilty and a skilled attorney may have been able to convince a jury and a court 
not to mete out the harsh sentence). 
 138. It is important to distinguish between legal innocence and actual innocence. To say 
that one is legally innocent of a crime is to say that based on the evidence presented in a court 
of law, the State failed to meet its burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The determination of legal innocence is grounded on one of the bedrock principles of 
our criminal justice system—that one is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The determina-
tion of legal innocence equates with a finding of “not guilty.” Legal innocence does not mean 
that a defendant did not really commit the crime with which he has been charged. Rather, legal 
innocence means that the defendant was not determined by that jury during that court pro-
ceeding to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
To say that one is actually innocent of a crime is to say that the defendant did not “do 
it.” It says more than that the defendant was not guilty—legally innocent—of the charge. It 
means that the defendant actually did not commit the charged offense. It means that the State 
has charged the wrong person with the crime. 
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successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim even if the represen-
tation that he received was deplorable.139 
The suggestion that prejudice to one’s case can be determined 
after the fact is troublesome in its own right.140 But to define preju-
dice in such a manner as to extend the privilege of the effective assis-
tance of counsel only to those who are, practically speaking, innocent 
of the charged offense goes too far.141 Constitutional rights should 
extend, not only to the actually innocent, but also to “guilty” defen-
dants as well.142 All individuals should enjoy Sixth Amendment rights 
and, accordingly, have the right to the effective assistance of counsel. 
All accused are entitled to receive constitutionally sound representa-
tion.143 To have an ineffective assistance of counsel claim available 
only to those who are innocent—as is the current state of the law—is 
misguided and offensive.144 The right to effective assistance of coun-
sel should be recognized, not for its own sake but for the effect it has  
 
 
 139. This is not to suggest that a guilty defendant cannot bring an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim when, for example, his sentence would have been lessened but for his coun-
sel’s deficient representation. It is merely to suggest that the “guilty” defendant will likely have 
great difficulty proving that the outcome of his proceeding would have been favorably differ-
ent. 
 140. Seriously considering the issue of whether the prejudice requirement should be dis-
pensed with altogether in ineffective assistance of counsel claims exceeds the scope of this arti-
cle. It is, however, a topic worthy of thorough consideration. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
712 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[A] showing that the performance of a defendant’s lawyer de-
parted from constitutionally prescribed standards requires a new trial regardless of whether the 
defendant suffered demonstrable prejudice thereby.”); id. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“The difficulties of estimating prejudice after the fact are exacerbated by the possibility that 
evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the 
incompetence of defense counsel.”). 
 141. See Geimer, supra note 66, at 131–39 (suggesting that once a criminal defendant 
demonstrates deficient performance, his conviction or sentence should be upheld only upon a 
showing by the prosecution that the denial of counsel was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt). 
 142. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majority contends 
that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a manifestly guilty defendant is convicted after 
a trial in which he was represented by a manifestly ineffective attorney. I cannot agree. Every 
defendant is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and conscientiously advo-
cated by an able lawyer.”). 
 143. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 n.19 (1984) (discussing that the 
Sixth Amendment requires counsel to “hold the prosecution to its heavy burden of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt,” even in the absence of a theory of defense). 
 144. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (discussing the importance of 
one’s constitutional right to counsel, even when one is not an intelligent and educated person 
with a perfect defense). 
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on the ability of the criminally accused—all criminally accused—to 
receive a fair trial.145 
d. Relying on cooperation of defense counsel is necessary yet prob-
lematic. Another impediment to bringing a successful ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim is the difficulty involved in obtaining the 
cooperation of the lawyer about whom the defendant is complaining. 
The cooperation of the defense lawyer is critical, greatly increasing 
the likelihood of success of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.146 A successful claim often inquires into defense counsel’s con-
versations and interactions with the defendant.147 Therefore, it is 
unlikely to be successful without the cooperation of the criminal de-
fense attorney about whom the defendant is complaining.148 
However, criminal defense attorneys whose conduct is the sub-
ject of ineffectiveness claims may have good reason to cooperate less 
than fully in a former client’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
for good reason. Criminal defense attorneys have at least three pow-
erful incentives for not cooperating to the fullest extent possible. 
First is the issue of pride and reputation. A client’s former attor-
ney will be less than enthusiastic about helping a former client pub-
licly criticize his representation. An ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim is an attack on a lawyer’s work. As such, a successful ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim will necessarily have an adverse effect on a 
lawyer’s reputation. It is understandable that many lawyers would be 
reluctant or altogether unwilling to participate actively in such an 
undertaking. 
Second, in many jurisdictions, failed ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims operate to shield a criminal defense attorney from civil 
liability.149 As discussed more fully below, without a successful inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim, in the majority of jurisdictions the 
 
 145. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. 
 146. See David M. Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty (or Your Life): The Ethical Obli-
gations of Criminal Defense Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 85 
(1998–99) (indicating that a lawyer’s duty of competency requires assisting the former client 
to probe into the quality of the previous assistance). 
 147. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (stating that “inquiry into counsel’s conversations 
with the defendant may be critical” to an ineffectiveness assistance of counsel claim). 
 148. See Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights 
We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 7 (1995) (discussing the fact that an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is unlikely to succeed if the criminal defense lawyer vigorously con-
tests the action). 
 149. See, e.g., infra Part III.B (discussing criminal malpractice actions). 
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ability to sue one’s criminal defense attorney for criminal malpractice 
is, in most instances, eliminated.150 Thus, the criminal defense attor-
ney seeking to avoid malpractice liability has a powerful incentive not 
to cooperate or otherwise be helpful to a former client seeking to 
prove an ineffectiveness claim.151 
The third reason for not cooperating is to forestall attorney dis-
cipline proceedings. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims draw at-
tention to a lawyer’s conduct. Although bringing or prevailing in an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not automatically trigger 
disciplinary proceedings in any jurisdiction, a successful claim cer-
tainly brings added attention to questionable lawyer conduct that 
would likely have otherwise gone unnoticed by the appropriate disci-
plinary body. An attorney’s cooperation in a former client’s ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim only aids in bringing attention to the 
lawyer’s misconduct. 
Maintaining reputation, shielding oneself from civil liability, and 
averting attention of disciplinary proceedings all provide powerful 
disincentives for a lawyer to participate in a former client’s ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. The chances of success for an ineffective-
ness claim are remote even with the lawyer’s assistance, but without 
it, the chances of success are virtually nil. 
3. Monitoring of criminal defense lawyering at the constitutional level 
is ineffective 
At the constitutional level, a criminal defendant may bring an in-
effective assistance of counsel claim as a means of enforcing one’s 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. However, 
the Strickland standards effectively leave criminal defendants a right 
without a remedy because ineffective assistance of counsel claims re-
quire that petitioners overcome strong and heavy presumptions fa-
voring their former lawyers, virtually require petitioners to be able to 
establish their innocence, and almost entirely depend on the willing-




 150. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 151. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 7 (explaining how the collateral estoppel rule oper-
ates to provide criminal defense attorneys a powerful incentive to oppose an ineffectiveness 
challenge to a former client’s conviction). 
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and admit to egregious professional misconduct. This explains why 
the vast majority of these claims are in large part unsuccessful.152 
As articulated by the Strickland court, the purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment include protecting the adversarial system and ensuring 
that the criminally accused receive a “fair” trial. However, the appar-
ent constitutional remedy for poor lawyering is, in actuality, not 
freely available. For the reasons discussed above, even the criminally 
accused who have been victimized by the worst kind of legal repre-
sentation are likely to find an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
practically speaking, unavailable. It is difficult to trust the integrity of 
our adversarial system and to believe that the criminally accused re-
ceive a fair trial when the means by which Sixth Amendment rights 
are enforced is in large part an illusion. The reality is that criminal 
defense lawyering at the constitutional level is not effectively moni-
tored. 
B. The Civil “Safeguard” Against Poor Criminal Defense Lawyering 
The second level at which the conduct of a criminal defense at-
torney may be monitored is the civil level. Criminal defendants dis-
satisfied with their legal representation may sue their former lawyer 
in negligence for legal malpractice.153 Criminal malpractice actions—
malpractice actions brought against criminal defense attorneys by 
their former clients—have been said to be the primary means upon 
which courts rely to enforce the competence of criminal defense law-
yers.154 In fact, court decisions and ethics opinions alike have opined 
that legal malpractice actions are the most appropriate venue in 
which to ensure competent lawyering.155 However, for the most part, 
courts have failed to use civil penalties to impose any real obligation 
 
 152. See Calhoun, supra note 114, at 414–16 (explaining and providing statistics to sup-
port the argument that ineffective assistance of counsel claims rarely succeed). 
 153. See Meredith J. Duncan, Legal Malpractice by Any Other Name: Why a Breach of Fi-
duciary Duty Claim Does Not Smell as Sweet, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1137, 1140–48 (1999) 
(describing that although the classic malpractice action is grounded in negligence, other mal-
practice actions are available such as claims for breach of fiduciary duty). 
 154. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 6 (discussing the malpractice action as the primary 
method relied upon by courts to enforce the competence of lawyers). 
 155. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Neale, 384 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1980) (holding that a 
malpractice action is the appropriate means by which to condemn a lawyer guilty of neglect); 
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 335, at n.1 (1974); see also 
Koniak, supra note 148, at 6 (asserting that ensuring reasonably competent lawyering has long 
been held to be the domain of malpractice). 
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of competence on criminal defense attorneys.156 Although some of 
the various purposes of tort law are to deter and punish careless con-
duct that injures another, the courts, by virtue of the illogical rules 
that remain in place, essentially preclude criminal defendants victim-
ized by incompetent lawyering from utilizing the tort system as a 
means of deterring and punishing poor criminal defense lawyering. 
Criminal defendants who have been victimized by negligent lawyer-
ing are too often collaterally estopped from bringing a criminal mal-
practice action at the civil level because courts erroneously conclude 
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims and criminal malpractice 
claims are equivalent actions.157 Some of those courts put a criminal 
malpractice action even further out of reach by requiring a showing 
of actual innocence prior to permitting recovery for criminal mal-
practice.158 As a result, for the most part, the conduct of criminal de-
fense attorneys is not scrutinized in a meaningful way at the civil 
level. 
1. The requirements of criminal malpractice claims 
As with all negligence actions, in order to hold a defendant liable 
for malpractice the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the defendant breached a duty of care which the de-
fendant owed the plaintiff and that breach caused a cognizable harm 
to the plaintiff.159 
Regarding the duty component of the plaintiff’s case, an attorney 
owes his client a duty to perform as the reasonably prudent attorney 
would perform under the same or similar circumstances.160 All things 
considered, this reasonably prudent attorney standard is low. By this 
standard, to avoid civil liability, a lawyer need only act as the mini-
mally competent attorney, a standard usually established by expert 
 
 156. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 5 (“[C]ase law generally demonstrates so little com-
mitment to [a criminal defense attorney’s] obligation to provide competent representation in 
the criminal context that it is difficult to describe legal ethics as defined by the courts as includ-
ing such an obligation.”). 
 157. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing how the doctrine of collateral estoppel operates to 
prevent one from bringing a criminal malpractice action). 
 158. See infra Part III.B.2.b (discussing that a showing of actual innocence is too often 
required to bring a criminal malpractice action). 
 159. See Duncan, supra note 153, at 1140–45 (explaining the requirements of a classic 
professional negligence action). 
 160. See id. at 1142–43 (discussing the applicable standard of care for a professional neg-
ligence action). 
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testimony.161 In order to establish breach, the malpractice plaintiff 
must prove that the attorney failed to meet that standard.162 If able 
to establish duty and breach, the malpractice plaintiff undertakes the 
most difficult component of any legal malpractice action, that of es-
tablishing that the attorney’s breach of the standard of care caused a 
cognizable harm to the plaintiff. The causation component requires 
the plaintiff to prove that the lawyer’s breach caused in fact and 
proximately caused actual harm to the plaintiff.163 
Establishing harm in any legal malpractice action—whether the 
underlying complained of representation was civil or criminal—is 
quite challenging. In the typical legal malpractice action where the 
underlying complained-of representation is civil, the malpractice 
plaintiff must prove a case within a case.164 For example, if the mal-
practice plaintiff claims that as the plaintiff in the underlying civil suit 
he lost to a defendant because of his lawyer’s negligent conduct, the 
malpractice plaintiff must not only prove that his lawyer breached a 
duty of care but that that very breach caused him to lose the law-
suit.165 In order to do so, the malpractice plaintiff must establish that 
he would have prevailed in the underlying action but for his lawyer’s 
incompetent representation.166 
Similarly, in the criminal malpractice context—where a criminal 
defendant sues his former attorney in negligence—the malpractice 
plaintiff has the same task; he must prove that his lawyer’s breach 
caused harm to him. However, in the criminal context the showing 
of harm is arguably more difficult than proof of harm in the civil 
malpractice context because in criminal malpractice claims, proof of 
harm generally require a showing that, from the plaintiff’s vantage 
 
 161. See id. (explaining that a professional negligence action usually requires expert testi-
mony). 
 162. See id. (discussing the duty and breach components of a professional negligence ac-
tion). 
 163. Causation in fact generally requires a finding that the plaintiff’s harm would not 
have occurred but for the lawyer’s breach. Proximate causation is a more abstract concept, as it 
is a determination of the appropriateness of holding a defendant civilly liable for a harm that 
the defendant did in fact cause. 
 164. See Duncan, supra note 153, at 1143–44 (describing the case-within-a-case re-
quirement in a typical legal malpractice action). 
 165. See id. 
 166. Additionally, as a component of the malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove that 
he would have been able to collect the amount of the judgment that the finder of fact would 
have awarded to him but for lawyer’s breach. 
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point, the result of the underlying criminal representation would 
have been favorably different. Proof either that the criminal malprac-
tice plaintiff would not have been convicted in the underlying repre-
sentation or that the malpractice plaintiff would have received a 
lesser sentence upon conviction but for counsel’s breach of the stan-
dard of care is generally required.167 
Successfully bringing a malpractice action against an attorney—
whether it be civil or criminal—is difficult even in the best of circum-
stances. The standard of care by which lawyers must conduct them-
selves is so dismally low that most attorneys rarely come close to fal-
ling below the applicable standard of care. Of those few that can be 
proven to have breached that standard, most still stand a good 
chance of avoiding liability in negligence due to the arduous causa-
tion and harm components of a legal malpractice claim. The picture 
is extremely bleak for criminal defendants who seek to sue their for-
mer attorneys for malpractice. As discussed below, criminal defense 
attorneys are virtually immunized from malpractice liability by a tort 
system apparently bent on protecting criminal defense lawyers from 
malpractice liability.168 Senseless impediments are in place that all but 
completely insulate criminal defense attorneys from liability, and our 
tort system is virtually emasculated as a vehicle for sanctioning and 
deterring incompetent criminal defense lawyering.169 
2. The impediment to bringing criminal malpractice actions: The 
doctrine of collateral estoppel 
In the majority of jurisdictions a plaintiff is barred from pursuing 
a criminal malpractice action if that plaintiff has not first obtained 
post-conviction relief.170 In these jurisdictions, an unsuccessful effort 
 
 167. In many jurisdictions, courts do not reach the issue of actual causation in criminal 
malpractice actions because they hold, as a matter of law, that the criminal defendant is the sole 
proximate cause of any harm suffered due to a conviction. See infra Part III.B.2.b. However, it 
is important to note that the issue of proximate causation is a different inquiry than the issue of 
actual harm in a malpractice action. In jurisdictions that do not hold that a criminal defendant 
is the sole proximate cause of any conviction, the finding of actual harm is essential to mainte-
nance of the malpractice action. 
 168. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 6–10 (explaining that criminal defense attorneys are 
less likely to be held liable for malpractice than are their civil counterparts and have what 
amounts to special immunity to perform incompetently). 
 169. This may explain why attorney malpractice insurance is quite inexpensive and why it 
is relatively easy to underwrite and monitor. 
 170. Post-conviction relief may take several forms, including habeas relief, reversal of the 
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at post-conviction relief operates as collateral estoppel for the crimi-
nal defendant seeking to bring a malpractice action against his for-
mer attorney.171 Because the vast majority of individuals pursuing an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim are unsuccessful,172 a large ma-
jority of those who may be inclined to pursue a criminal malpractice 
claim are collaterally estopped from doing so. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a procedural means by 
which a party can prevent another party from relitigating issues that 
were decided in a previous lawsuit.173 It is a discretionary device said 
to be necessitated by judicial economy and fairness.174 The appropri-
ateness of applying the doctrine in any particular case rests on 
whether the party against whom estoppel is sought previously had a 
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.175 This determination is 
 
conviction on direct appeal, or the grant of a new trial. See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 148, at 6–7 
(noting that state courts are all but unanimous in holding that a criminal defendant who loses 
an ineffectiveness claim is collaterally estopped from suing for malpractice); Peeler v. Hughes & 
Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. 1995) (“[W]ithout first establishing that she has been exon-
erated by direct appeal, post-conviction relief, or otherwise, Peeler cannot sue her [criminal 
defense] attorney.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566 (Alaska 1993) (holding that a criminal mal-
practice claim does not accrue until the plaintiff obtains post-conviction relief); Stevens v. 
Bispham, 851 P.2d 556 (Or. 1993) (holding that, for statute of limitations purposes, the legal 
malpractice action did not accrue until the date on which the conviction was set aside and the 
client was released); Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108 (Pa. 1993) (stating that a plaintiff will not 
prevail in a criminal malpractice action unless he has first obtained post-trial relief). 
 172. See discussion supra Part III.B (stating that most petitioners who bring an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim are unsuccessful). 
 173. See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 4402 (1981); Eli J. Richardson, Taking Issue with Issue Preclusion: Reinventing 
Collateral Estoppel, 65 MISS. L.J. 41, 53–58 (1995) (explaining that the effect of collateral es-
toppel is that the estopped party may not relitigate the precluded issue); see also John Bernard 
Corr, Supreme Court Doctrine in the Trenches: The Case of Collateral Estoppel, 27 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 35, 36 (1985) (explaining the doctrine of collateral estoppel); Laura Gaston Dooley, 
The Cult of Finality: Rethinking Collateral Estoppel in the Postmodern Age, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 
43 (critiquing the appropriateness of the doctrine of collateral estoppel inasmuch as the doc-
trine circumvents the power of the community to speak in given contexts). 
 174. See Richardson, supra note 173 (explaining the ultimate objective of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel as reducing litigation); see also Corr, supra note 173, at 38–39 (discussing 
the history of collateral estoppel as set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision Blonder-Tongue 
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 412 U.S. 303 (1971)); Dooley, supra 
note 173, at 51–63 (describing the benefit of applying the collateral estoppel doctrine as the 
“been there, done that” rationale and opining that our system justifies the use of collateral es-
toppel because of the fear of different decisionmakers in different contexts making inconsistent 
findings). 
 175. See Corr, supra note 173, at 36–37 (explaining that courts have discretion to apply 
collateral estoppel if an issue has previously been litigated fully and fairly). 
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not defined by any one test176 but commonly requires a showing that 
(1) the issue sought to be precluded in the current suit is identical to 
the one involved in the prior litigation, (2) the issue was actually liti-
gated in the former suit, (3) the issue was a critical and necessary part 
of the former judgment, and (4) the party sought to be prevented 
from relitigating the issue had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue in the former proceeding.177In criminal malpractice actions, 
the defendant criminal defense lawyer seeks to use the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel to preclude his former client from litigating the 
issue of the lawyer’s negligence. In many jurisdictions, courts have 
concluded that a previous failed ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim collaterally estops a criminal malpractice plaintiff from litigating 
the issue of his former attorney’s negligence. Courts so holding base 
their decision on a finding that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims and criminal malpractice claims involve the determination of 
identical issues. As discussed below, the problem with this conclusion 
is that it is simply wrong. 
a. Standards of care, actual harm, and Strickland presumptions 
are not equivalent findings. The majority of courts who have consid-
ered the issue have incorrectly concluded that the deficient perform-
ance requirement of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim178 and a 
breach of the standard of care requirement of a criminal malpractice 
claim179 involve identical factual issues.180 Likewise, these courts have 
incorrectly concluded that proving prejudice in an ineffective assis-
 
 176. See Richardson, supra note 173, at 49 (explaining that collateral estoppel elements 
vary from court to court). 
 177. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); DeWeese v. Town of 
Palm Beach, 688 F.2d 731, 733 (11th Cir. 1982); Stovall v. Price Waterhouse Co., 652 F.2d 
537, 540 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Richardson, supra note 173, at 47–50 (discussing the ele-
ments of collateral estoppel). Some courts define the elements of collateral estoppel as consist-
ing of an inquiry similar to determining (1) whether the issue is identical to an issue in the ear-
lier proceeding; (2) whether the issue was actually litigated in the earlier proceeding; and (3) 
whether the determination of the issue in the earlier proceeding was a critical and necessary 
part of that judgment. See id. at 49. 
 178. See supra Part III.A.1.a (describing the deficiency prong of an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim). 
 179. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing the breach of the standard of care requirement of a 
criminal malpractice claim). 
 180. See, e.g., Hockett v. Breunig, 526 N.E.2d 995, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (Shields, 
J., concurring) (finding that Strickland’s deficient performance determination is the same as 
the criminal malpractice standard); Alberici v. Tinari, 542 A.2d 127, 131–32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1988) (same). 
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tance of counsel claim and harm in a criminal malpractice claim are 
identical determinations. Concluding that deficient performance and 
a breach of the standard of care are equivalent findings and that 
prejudice and harm are equivalent findings have led these courts to 
conclude mistakenly that collateral estoppel is appropriately applied 
in a criminal malpractice action brought subsequent to an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
Proving that a lawyer failed to perform reasonably under prevail-
ing professional norms181 may, upon superficial consideration, sound 
much like proving that a lawyer failed to perform as the reasonably 
prudent lawyer would under the same circumstances.182 Similarly, 
proving that a lawyer’s deficient conduct prejudiced his client’s 
case183 may sound much like proving that a lawyer’s breach of a stan-
dard of care caused harm to the malpractice plaintiff. However, a 
more thorough consideration reveals otherwise. Because of the pre-
sumptions of Strickland184 that burden a defendant in an ineffective 
assistance case, proving deficient performance and prejudice in such a 
case is far more demanding than merely establishing the negligence 
of counsel in a criminal malpractice action.185 
As discussed earlier, to prevail in a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, the petitioner is required to establish constitutionally defi-
cient performance.186 In doing so, the petitioner must work against 
the strong presumption that his counsel’s performance fell within 
reasonable professional norms.187 The petitioner does not begin his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on level ground. Rather, the 
ineffective assistance of counsel petitioner must overcome the strong 
presumption that his lawyer’s conduct was reasonable. 
 
 181. A Strickland petitioner is required to do so to satisfy the deficiency prong of an inef-
fective assistance of counsel claim. See supra Part III.A.1.a (discussing the deficiency prong of 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
 182. A criminal malpractice plaintiff is required to do so to establish breach of the stan-
dard of care in a criminal malpractice action. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the require-
ments of bringing a criminal malpractice action). 
 183. This is required of the petitioner bringing an ineffective assistance claim. See supra 
Part III.A.1 (discussing requirements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
 184. See supra Part III.A.2 (describing the Strickland presumptions). 
 185. This is not to suggest that there are not other distinctions between proving defi-
ciency and proving breach of the standard of care. 
 186. See supra Part III.A.1.a (describing the deficiency prong of an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim). 
 187. See supra Part III.A.2.a (describing presumptions related to the deficiency prong of a 
Strickland challenge). 
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In comparison, the criminal malpractice plaintiff, in proving that 
the defendant failed to perform as the reasonably prudent attorney 
would perform under the same or similar circumstances, is unbur-
dened by any such presumptions.188 Rather, the criminal malpractice 
plaintiff begins on level ground in seeking to prove that his lawyer’s 
conduct was unreasonable.189 
Similarly, proving prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim and proving harm in a criminal malpractice claim are not iden-
tical determinations. Because of the burdensome Strickland pre-
sumptions, the ineffective assistance of counsel petitioner seeking to 
establish prejudice has a heavier burden than does the criminal mal-
practice plaintiff seeking to establish harm. As previously discussed, 
in determining prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
courts are to indulge a strong presumption that the outcome of the 
petitioner’s case is reliable; the court is to presume that the result of 
the criminal trial is correct and just. In order to establish prejudice, 
then, the petitioner must start from the presumption that no harm in 
fact occurred and prove the contrary, a great burden indeed. 
In comparison, the criminal malpractice plaintiff must prove that 
he suffered actual harm from his attorney’s breach of the standard of 
care. In so doing, the criminal malpractice plaintiff starts with a clean 
slate, free from any presumption that such harm did not occur. Ob-
viously, establishing that his lawyer’s conduct in some measurable 
manner injured his case and thereby caused him actual harm is a dif-
ficult task but one that is easier than that of the ineffective assistance 
of counsel petitioner. 
These distinctions are critical. The Strickland presumptions make 
it much harder for the ineffective assistance of counsel petitioner to 
prove that his lawyer provided constitutionally deficient performance 
than it is for the criminal malpractice plaintiff to establish breach of 
the standard of care. Likewise, because of the Strickland presump-
tions it is much more difficult for the ineffective assistance of counsel  
petitioner to establish prejudice than it is for the criminal malpractice 
plaintiff to prove harm sufficient to support a negligence action.190 
 
 188. See supra Part III.B.1 (describing the requirements of a criminal malpractice claim). 
 189. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 8 (explaining that Strickland sets out presumptions 
that make it much more difficult for the ineffective assistance of counsel petitioner to meet his 
burden of showing substandard lawyer performance than for the civil plaintiff to show negli-
gent conduct). 
 190. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 9 (stating that it is much more difficult to establish 
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It is possible that a malpractice plaintiff’s proof of his attorney’s 
misconduct could fall short of Strickland’s heightened requirements 
but might nonetheless satisfy ordinary tort standards of negligence. 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim, or what may be termed 
constitutional malpractice, requires a finding of ultra-incompetence. 
Consequently, it is entirely inappropriate for courts to equate the 
two findings. It is clear that the petitioner has a significantly heavier 
burden of persuasion with respect to these issues in the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.191 Proving breach of the standard of care 
and proving deficient performance are not identical processes or 
findings; nor are proving actual harm and prejudice identical. Ac-
cordingly, findings regarding deficient performance and prejudice 
stemming from an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should not 
be treated as the identical issues as the determination of breach of 
the standard of care and harm in negligence actions for collateral es-
toppel purposes.192 
b. Requiring a showing of actual innocence is unreasonable. A fur-
ther cause for concern is that in addition to the rule in the majority 
of jurisdictions that a failed ineffective assistance of counsel claim op-
erates to collaterally estop a criminal defendant from pursuing a 
criminal malpractice claim, many jurisdictions also require that a 
criminal malpractice plaintiff prove that the plaintiff was actually in-
nocent of the charges against which the attorney defended him.193 
 
prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim than it is to establish actual harm in a 
criminal malpractice suit). 
 191. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a discretionary doctrine, and many reasons have 
been articulated to encourage courts not to apply the doctrine in various circumstances. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1980). For instance, one of the legal excep-
tions to collateral estoppel is particularly compelling here: it is clear that “the party against 
whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the 
issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1980). 
 192. See Kerkman v. Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett, 519 N.W.2d 862, 863 
(Mich. 1994) (rejecting the collateral estoppel rule because of the higher standard required of 
Strickland challenges due to the presumptions as opposed to the ordinary criminal malpractice 
standard). 
 193. See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 861 P.2d 566 (Alaska 1993); Wiley v. County of San Diego, 
966 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1998) (holding that in order to bring a criminal malpractice action against 
the public defender, the client was required to prove that he was actually innocent of the 
charge for which he was convicted); Rowe v. Schreiber, 725 So. 2d 1245, 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1999) (holding that the criminal defendant must prove that he was innocent of the un-
derlying crime in order to prevail on a claim of criminal malpractice against his attorney); Lamb 
v. Manweiler, 923 P.2d 976 (Idaho 1996); Moore v. Owens, 698 N.E.2d 707 (Ill. App. Ct. 
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These jurisdictions suggest that without a showing of actual inno-
cence, the criminal malpractice plaintiff is the sole proximate cause of 
his predicament.194 Liability for any harm suffered by the criminal de-
fendant is not, as a matter of law, extended to his lawyer, even if the 
lawyer performed incompetently. This is troubling. 
This actual innocence requirement makes the tort system only 
available to the innocent individual who apparently was unjustly ac-
cused.195 However, the fact that a criminal defendant has committed 
the criminal offense with which he has been charged does not mean 
that he cannot suffer a cognizable harm by virtue of incompetent 
representation.196 The fact that a person has committed the charged 
offense does not necessarily ensure that the jury will find him legally 
guilty. This is the difference between legal innocence and actual in-
nocence.197 In other words, when represented by non-negligent 
counsel, a criminal defendant who actually committed the charged 
 
1998); Glen v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783 (Mass. 1991); State ex rel. O’Blennis v. Adolph, 691 
S.W.2d 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) Mahoney v. Shaheen, Cappiello, Stein & Gordon, P.A., 727 
A.2d 996 (N.H. 1999); Gill v. Blau, 651 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Stevens v. 
Bispham, 851 P.2d 556 (Or. 1993) ; Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995); 
Reimann v. Ginsberg, 592 N.W.2d 319 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (unpublished table decision). 
 194. See, e.g., Shaw, 861 P.2d at 572 (Alaska 1993) (“[I]f plaintiffs engaged in the crimi-
nal conduct they are accused of, then they alone should bear full responsibility for the conse-
quences of their acts, including imprisonment. Any subsequent negligent conduct by a plain-
tiff’s attorney is superseded by the greater culpability of the plaintiff’s criminal conduct.”); 
Wiley, 966 P.2d 983 (holding that for public policy reasons, a guilty defendant’s criminal con-
duct must be considered to be the sole proximate cause of his imprisonment); Peeler, 909 S.W. 
at 499 (ruling that criminal conduct of a defendant who is unable to prove his actual innocence 
is the sole proximate cause of his indictment and conviction for that offense). 
 195. It does so in a manner that is more blatant than the manner in which the prejudice 
requirement of Strickland renders an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a privilege of the 
innocent. See supra Part III.A.2.c (describing how ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 
essentially a claim for the innocent). 
 196. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 10 (explaining that a criminal defendant who com-
mitted the charged offense can be harmed by a lawyer’s breach of the standard of care by, for 
example, the lawyer failing to move for the exclusion of damaging evidence or a confession, 
failing to communicate a plea offer made by the State, or failing to investigate or present a de-
fense); cf. Peeler, 909 S.W.2d 494 (involving complaint by criminal defendant that she suffered 
harm because, prior to the time that she pled guilty, her attorney failed to convey a more fa-
vorable plea offer to her). 
 197. A criminal defendant acquitted of the charges is not determined by the jury to be 
innocent of the charges. Rather, a criminal defendant acquitted of the charges against him is 
found not guilty by the finder of fact, a finding that does not necessarily reflect actual inno-
cence but instead represents the jury’s determination that the State failed to meet its burden of  
proof of finding the defendant guilty of each and every element of the criminal offense of 
which the defendant was charged. 
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offense may ultimately be rendered not guilty—legally innocent—of 
the offense.198 But the same criminal defendant represented by in-
competent counsel does not have that same opportunity. In our 
criminal justice system, which is grounded on the principle that a de-
fendant is legally innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the charged offense, not allowing all defendants to bring 
criminal malpractice claims is a cognizable harm and should be rec-
ognized as such.199 
Permitting only actually innocent criminal defendants to avail 
themselves of the tort system exposes all criminal defendants—
whether innocent or not—to representation by lawyers who have the 
dangerous freedom of practicing without accountability. Moreover, 
and perhaps more importantly, even a criminal defendant who has 
actually committed the criminal offense with which he has been 
charged is entitled not only to legal representation in his defense but 
to non-negligent legal representation. Requiring actual innocence in 
the pursuit of a criminal malpractice claim prevents non-innocent 
criminal defendants from being entitled to adequate legal representa-
tion.200 This is a bizarre and utterly unprincipled outcome in which 
those persons most in need of adequate legal representation are ex-
posed to the greatest risk of inadequate representation. The tragic 
result is that criminal defendants run the risk of being represented by 
 
 198. It is a principle upon which our justice system is based: “It is better that ten guilty 
persons escape than that one innocent suffer.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 27 (1862). 
 199. This may be comparable to the loss of chance doctrine of tort law, a doctrine recog-
nized in a few jurisdictions in medical malpractice cases. The loss of chance doctrine enables a 
plaintiff to establish causation in fact when a defendant’s negligent conduct possibly, but not 
probably, caused in fact the harm which the plaintiff suffered. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group 
Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (allowing plaintiff to 
recover in negligence for loss of chance); see also Polly A. Lord, Comment, Loss of Chance in 
Legal Malpractice, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1479 (1986) (exploring adoption of the loss of chance 
doctrine in legal malpractice). 
 200. See generally Koniak, supra note 148.  The author explains the difference between 
establishing actual innocence and showing damages in a malpractice action as follows: 
Please note that [the requirement of actual innocence] is quite different from the 
ordinary requirement in malpractice cases that a plaintiff must show damages. . . . A 
corporate civil defendant found liable [for the wrongful death of a child], whose 
lawyer failed [to perform competently], need not establish that it did not in fact 
cause the wrongful death of the child to prevail in a malpractice suit, but merely that 
the result in the case would more likely than not have been different but for the er-
rors. 
Id. at 10. 
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defense attorneys who practice without accountability—at least inso-
far as civil liability is concerned. 
3. Monitoring of criminal defense lawyering at the civil level is 
essentially unavailable 
Criminal defense attorneys are virtually immune from civil liabil-
ity. For the reasons previously discussed, on a practical level, criminal 
malpractice actions are unnecessarily unavailable to persons who may 
have been harmed by incompetent criminal defense lawyering. Many 
justifications are offered for restricting criminal malpractice actions in 
this manner; however, none of them withstand scrutiny.201 Some say 
that facilitating criminal malpractice actions would encourage the fil-
ing of frivolous suits or that it would lessen the use of plea bar-
gains.202 Others suggest that it would render the defense bar unwill-
ing to exercise its own independent legal judgment or, worse still, 
provide a disincentive for practitioners to practice criminal defense 
work.203 However, the most oft-stated reason for hindering a crimi-
nal malpractice plaintiff’s ability to bring a claim is that a guilty de-
fendant should not, for public policy reasons, be entitled to receive 
damages from his attorney’s failure to procure an acquittal or lesser 
sentence.204 Particularly in jurisdictions that require a showing of ac-
tual innocence in order to bring a criminal malpractice action, the 
objection is that it is imprudent to allow non-innocent people to 
benefit from the legal system by allowing them to bring a malprac-
tice action. The reasoning is that a person who has been adjudged 
 
 201. See id. at 12 (explaining that the excuses and justifications for the way that the sys-
tem operates in failing to provide the effective monitoring of criminal defense attorneys “de-
mands nothing of criminal defense lawyers, accepting almost all actual performance as adequate 
performance”). “It demands nothing of the rest of us, allowing us to continue to pride our-
selves on guaranteeing the right of counsel in criminal cases, while not paying enough to en-
sure that indigent criminal defendants receive competent representation.” Id. 
 202. See id. (noting that “the fear of frivolous malpractice suits may be driving the adop-
tion of these hurdles for criminal defendants”). 
 203. See id. (“[T]his argument boils down to nothing more than an admission that we do 
not pay these lawyers enough to demand that they be competent.”). 
 204. See Carmel v. Lunney, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (N.Y. 1987) (concluding that public 
policy prevents a criminal defendant who cannot assert his innocence from maintaining a 
criminal malpractice action against his former defense lawyer); Susan M. Treyz, Note, Crimi-
nal Malpractice: Privilege of the Innocent Plaintiff?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 732 (1991) 
(discussing the trend of some courts to justify the actual innocence requirement in criminal 
malpractice suits as ensuring that guilty criminal defendants do not receive windfall damages 
for their attorney’s failure to procure an acquittal). 
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guilty of a criminal offense has forfeited various societal privileges, 
one being the right to pursue a criminal malpractice action.205 
The problem with this articulation in particular is that it is im-
possible to determine whether a person would have been rendered 
legally innocent if competent counsel had represented him. It simply 
is not the case that every person who has actually committed an of-
fense can be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense if 
represented by non-negligent counsel. How can or why should a 
criminal defendant have to establish after a conviction that he was ac-
tually innocent before being afforded an opportunity to complain of 
incompetent legal representation? Can it truly be, as it seems, that 
we care only for the innocent person mistakenly entangled within the 
criminal justice system? It seems counterintuitive and illogical to sug-
gest so. 
Some courts claim that it is not judicially economical to allow 
criminal malpractice plaintiffs to bring negligence suits because the 
criminal system provides a remedy in the form of an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim.206 Others have reasoned that it is illogical and 
unreasonable to allow a criminal defendant the opportunity to collect 
from his counsel for malpractice if he has failed in his ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim.207 What is illogical and unreasonable is that 
 
 205. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 11 (discussing the rights-based perspective that is 
used to justify the innocence hurdle and pointing out that criminal defendants who may have 
actually “done it” do “not lose the right to sue and collect damages for other wrongs experi-
enced in the criminal justice system, like police brutality”). It is suggested in such circum-
stances that the criminal defendant’s criminal act is the sole proximate cause of his predicament 
irrespective of his counsel’s negligence, or that if the defendant was factually guilty, then no 
legally cognizable harm can be established to support the malpractice action. See id. 
 206. See, e.g., Shaw v. State, 816 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Alaska 1991) (stating that “the re-
quirement of post-conviction relief promotes judicial economy because many issues litigated in 
the quest for post-conviction relief will be duplicated later in the legal malpractice action”); 
Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo, 25 P.3d 670, 675–76 (Cal. 2001) (opining that many of the 
issues litigated in a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel would be duplicated in a legal 
malpractice action); Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1999) (outlining policy argu-
ments, such as the preservation of judicial economy, for having the prerequisite of post-
conviction relief in order to maintain a legal malpractice claim); Rowe v. City of Fort Lauder-
dale, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that remedies for ineffective 
assistance of counsel are available and that the requirement of appellate or post-conviction re-
lief for a malpractice claim promotes judicial economy by avoiding the relitigation of suppos-
edly settled issues). 
 207. See Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989); Robert J. Hoffman, Legal Mal-
practice in the Criminal Context: Is Postconviction Relief Required?, 47 FLA. B.J. 66, 66 (2000) 
(indicating that one of the key policy reasons that Florida courts have cited in barring a crimi- 
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these courts have, by an unconcerned attitude for the interests of 
criminal defendants or an unsatisfactory consideration of the legally 
relevant issues, mistakenly concluded that these actions are essentially 
equivalent. However, as indicated above,208 these courts are in error 
because the requirements of an ineffective assistance of counsel case 
far exceed those that should govern a criminal malpractice action. 
The excessive concern behind each of these rationales for the 
rights of deficient criminal defense counsel has profound negative 
consequences going far beyond the injustice engendered in specific 
cases. By hindering the use of the tort system as a means of monitor-
ing criminal defense lawyering, the system has foreclosed yet another 
means for assuring that a criminal defendant will receive competent 
representation. Instead, criminal defense—the backbone of our fun-
damental liberties—is transformed into an area where the inept, the 
indifferent, the incompetent, and even the unprincipled practitioners 
among us can continue to sully our profession with impunity. The 
apparent civil remedy for poor lawyering is, in actuality, an illusion. 
The reality is that too often there is no civil check on errant defense 
lawyers at all. 
C. The Disciplinary “Safeguard” Against Poor  
Criminal Defense Lawyering 
1. The disciplinary process 
The third level at which the conduct of a criminal defense attor-
ney may be monitored is the disciplinary level. The legal profession—
like many other professions—has anticipated its share of incompe-
tence.209 As a result, every jurisdiction has adopted some version of 
either the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct or the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 
 
nal defendant from bringing a malpractice action against his lawyer is the fact that doing so 
would be unreasonable and illogical). 
 208. See supra Part III.B.2.a (distinguishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
from a criminal malpractice action). 
 209. In every jurisdiction, the appropriate state bar has enacted rules of professional con-
duct that govern the lawyers practicing within that jurisdiction. Every code of professional 
conduct contains provisions mandating that lawyers practicing within the jurisdiction be com-
petent or be subject to discipline. See, e.g., Preamble to MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT: 
A Lawyer’s Responsibilities (1983) (“In all professional functions, a lawyer should be compe-
tent, prompt and diligent.”); id. R. 1.1 (requiring that all lawyers be competent). 
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ethical guidelines by which lawyers must conduct themselves. Addi-
tionally, every jurisdiction has a body charged with the responsibility 
of enforcing the applicable ethical rules or codes. Sanctions for vio-
lating ethical standards range anywhere from private reprimand to 
permanent disbarment.210 
2. Monitoring of criminal defense lawyering at the disciplinary level is 
underutilized 
The disciplinary process is rarely used as a means of ensuring that 
clients receive competent lawyering.211 In fact, ethics opinions and 
decisions alike have indicated that the disciplinary process should not 
be used to ensure that clients receive competent lawyering.212 This is 
unfortunate because, as long as the other levels at which defense 
lawyering may be safeguarded—namely, the constitutional level and 
the civil level—remain essentially illusory, the disciplinary level is the 
most easily accessible means by which criminal defendants can begin 
to be protected against bad lawyering.213 
To date, not one jurisdiction seems actively to use the discipli-
nary process to protect criminal defendants from incompetent crimi-
nal defense representation, even though doing so could help to 
compensate for the shortcomings of the constitutional and civil safe-
guards.214 Neither bringing nor prevailing at an ineffective assistance 
 
 210. See generally Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the Stan-
dards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing various 
problems associated with imposing sanctions against lawyers for professional misconduct). 
 211. See Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas 
Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1125–26 
(indicating that ineffective or incompetent counsel have little to fear from state ethics boards); 
see also Koniak, supra note 148, at 6 (discussing the fact that discipline for lawyer incompe-
tence is rare and generally reserved for situations that involve either multiple instances of in-
competence or incompetence coupled with other lawyer misconduct). 
 212. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 6 (citing Florida Bar v. Neale, 384 So. 2d 1264, 
1265 (Fla. 1980) and ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 335, at 
n.1 (1974)). 
 213. See Geimer, supra note 66, at 95–96 (recommending upgrading ethics codes and 
rules of professional responsibility in order to more effectively improve criminal defense lawyer-
ing because “the state of the right to counsel today calls for more . . . radical responses”); cf. 
Koniak, supra note 148, at 9 (pointing out that the fact that courts do not protect criminal 
defendants’ rights in the courts could be a little more palatable if the system protected those 
same rights through another means, like through the disciplinary process). 
 214. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 9 (“[H]aving adopted the collateral estoppel rule for 
malpractice actions, not one court has made the slightest move to find some other method of 
demonstrating commitment to the obligation that lawyers provide competent representation to 
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of counsel claim or a criminal malpractice claim subjects the lawyer 
involved to any disciplinary proceedings whatsoever.215 This is unfor-
tunate because in the absence of constitutional or tort remedies the 
disciplinary process is an ideal starting place to move toward ensuring 
competent levels of legal professionalism in criminal defense lawyer-
ing.216 Referral of poor criminal defense lawyering to appropriate dis-
ciplinary bodies is far too infrequent.217 The failure of our system to 
do so renders the disciplinary system woefully inadequate at protect-
ing criminal defendants against poor lawyering. 
IV. TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE MEANS OF SAFEGUARDING AGAINST 
POOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERING 
Recall the pitifully inadequate representations of Calvin Burdine 
and Perry Bellamy.218 Calvin Burdine’s lawyer slept through substan-
tial portions of his capital murder trial, yet it took sixteen years of 
appeal before a sharply divided court ruled that the legal representa-
tion he received was constitutionally inadequate. The representation 
that Perry Bellamy received was never determined to be inadequate 
at any level; he lost his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as do 
the vast majority of those who pursue ineffectiveness claims. As a re-
sult, he and others like him, in the majority of jurisdictions, are un-
able to pursue a criminal malpractice claim against their attorneys. 
Moreover, in the majority of jurisdictions, the offending lawyers will 
likely not face any disciplinary sanction. 
This situation is intolerable. The most vulnerable of all clients—
criminal defendants who often have no voice—need the very best 
 
criminal defendants.”); Treyz, supra note 200, at 732 (discussing that “[s]tate bar associations 
are often reluctant to impose sanctions for attorney incompetence”). 
 215. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 9–10 (“The lawyer may experience some degree of 
humiliation, assuming peers read the court decision reversing the defendant’s conviction. But 
that is it.”); see also Irwin D. Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys’ 
Supervisory Duties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259 (1994) (describing the disciplinary process as 
passive and reactive until it is made aware of professional misconduct, at which point the disci-
plinary process is triggered). 
 216. See Treyz, supra note 204, at 732 (describing the state bar level as the only method 
of assuring competent legal professionalism in the criminal defense context). 
 217. This may also be related in small part to the sad fact that, in this day and age, seem-
ingly few take legal ethics and notions of legal professionalism seriously. See generally STEVEN 
L. CARTER, INTEGRITY (1996) (discussing the decline of ethics and morality in society gener-
ally). 
 218. See supra Part II (discussing in detail the representations of Calvin Burdine and 
Perry Bellamy). 
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lawyering and protection from poor lawyering.219 However, they are 
the ones who too often receive the very worst our profession has to 
offer.220 
A criminally accused’s constitutional right to receive legal repre-
sentation is embodied in the Sixth Amendment. In Strickland v. 
Washington,221 the United States Supreme Court explained the con-
tours of this right in detail. However, as previously explained, be-
cause of the now-familiar two-prong test of Strickland, it is exceed-
ingly difficult for a petitioner to prove that he received 
constitutionally inept representation. The consequences of this are 
far reaching because failure of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim often adversely affects any possible criminal malpractice claim, 
and effective disciplinary review is inadequate. 
Making changes to our current system of monitoring criminal 
defense lawyering presents many challenges. However, one thing is 
clear—as long as the United States Supreme Court leaves Strickland 
intact, it is imperative that the legal system take additional steps to 
ensure that criminal defendants receive the competent counsel to 
which they are entitled. These steps should include implementing an 
automatic referral system of reporting instances of poor criminal de-
fense lawyering; abolishing the collateral estoppel effect of a Strick-
land challenge on a criminal malpractice action; abolishing any re-
quirement of a showing of actual innocence in bringing a criminal 
malpractice claim; permitting a claimant to file a Strickland claim and 
criminal malpractice claim at the same time; and encouraging trial 
judges to document and report instances of poor criminal defense 
lawyering. 
A. Implementing an Automatic Referral System 
A strong disciplinary process provides the easiest means by which 
our system can begin what may be a long process of seeking to pro-
tect criminal defendants against poor lawyering. By starting with the 
disciplinary process to keep an eye on criminal defense attorneys, the 
 
 219. See Koniak, supra note 148 (providing an excellent discussion of how the ethical 
obligations articulated and imposed by the courts provide little protection of the most power-
less and vulnerable clients). 
 220. Cf. Bright, supra note 35, at 1863 (explaining that the legal representation of capital 
defendants is often very poor). 
 221. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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overall quality of criminal defense lawyering may begin to improve. 
As a starting point, an automatic referral system should be imple-
mented. This referral system would operate to report automatically 
the conduct of any lawyer who is the subject of an ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim or a criminal malpractice claim to the appro-
priate disciplinary body. At that point, a screening panel of the disci-
plinary body set up for this purpose would first review the merits of 
the claim to ensure that only the viable claims of criminal defense 
lawyer misconduct move forward in the process. If the screening 
panel determines that the lawyer’s alleged conduct merits further re-
view, the lawyer’s case would then be sent for complete investigation 
and review by the appropriate disciplinary body. That body would 
evaluate and, if necessary, sanction the offending lawyer. Having this 
automatic referral system would ensure that instances of poor repre-
sentation of criminal defendants are not overlooked by the body 
charged with enforcing the applicable disciplinary rules. 
B. Abolishing the Collateral Estoppel Effect of  Strickland Challenges on 
Criminal Malpractice Claims 
Another step in the direction of improving our system’s ability to 
effectively monitor criminal defense lawyering is for courts to abolish 
the rule in the majority of jurisdictions that an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim operates to bar any subsequent criminal malpractice 
claim. Application of the collateral estoppel doctrine is inappropriate. 
The courts applying the collateral estoppel rule fail to comprehend 
real and significant distinctions between issues relevant to an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim and a criminal malpractice claim. Is-
sues germane to both actions are similar but are not identical enough 
to justify or merit an ineffective assistance of counsel claim collater-
ally estopping a criminal malpractice claim.222 
C. Abolishing the Actual Innocence Requirement for Bringing a 
Criminal Malpractice Claim 
Courts should also abolish the actual innocence requirement for 
bringing a criminal malpractice claim that exists in many jurisdic-
tions. The actual innocence rule makes the tort system available only 
to the innocent. However, both the innocent and the guilty accused 
 
 222. See supra Part III.B.2. 
1DUN.DOC 3/23/02  11:34 AM 
1] (So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys 
 47 
of a criminal offense are entitled to non-negligent legal representa-
tion. A guilty defendant may be harmed by negligent legal represen-
tation. If a criminal malpractice action plaintiff can prove a measur-
able, cognizable harm caused by the incompetent legal 
representation he received—even in the absence of proof of actual 
innocence—the criminal malpractice plaintiff should be able to pro-
ceed in negligence against his former attorney. 
Permitting only actually innocent criminal defendants to avail 
themselves of the tort system exposes all criminal defendants—
whether innocent or not—to representation by lawyers who have the 
dangerous freedom of practicing law without accountability. Lawyers 
who practice law without accountability run the risk of providing the 
worst legal representation.  
D. Allowing the Joint Filing of  Strickland Challenges  
and Criminal Malpractice Claims 
An alternative solution for courts unwilling to abolish the collat-
eral estoppel rule is to either permit a claimant to file his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim and criminal malpractice action simulta-
neously or to allow the statute of limitations on the malpractice ac-
tion to be tolled until his attempt at post-conviction relief is re-
solved. Although ineffective assistance of counsel claims and criminal 
malpractice claims are distinct causes of action, the conduct underly-
ing both claims may prove to be identical.223 Therefore, permitting 
both causes of action to go forward simultaneously may conserve ju-
dicial resources by reducing the litigation of the same or similar legal 
issues.224 Alternatively, permitting the statute of limitations for the 
malpractice action to be tolled until the post-conviction relief is ob-
tained would also promote judicial economy and the conservation of 
judicial resources in the same manner.225 Permitting the joint filing 
 
 223. See supra Part III.B.2 (explaining the distinction between ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims and criminal malpractice actions). 
 224. Cf. Shaw v. State, 816 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Alaska 1991) (considering the issue of 
whether the interest of judicial economy is furthered by tolling the statute of limitations for a 
criminal malpractice action until post-conviction relief is granted to prevent duplicative find-
ings in the subsequent malpractice action); Gebhardt v. O’Rourke, 510 N.W.2d 900, 905 
(Mich. 1994) (same). 
 225. See Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1360 (ruling that the statute of limitations for the criminal 
malpractice action is tolled until the claimant obtains post-conviction relief); Carmel v. Lun-
ney, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (N.Y. 1987) (tolling the statute of limitations for the criminal 
malpractice action and explaining that certain “aspects of criminal proceedings make criminal 
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of these claims would be more efficient, would preserve judicial re-
sources, and would dissipate any collateral estoppel concerns. 
E. Encouraging Trial Judges to Document and Report Instances of 
Poor Criminal Defense Lawyering 
Judges before whom ineffective assistance of counsel claims or 
criminal malpractice claims are filed should refer any questionable 
lawyer behavior about which the petitioner or plaintiff complain to 
the appropriate disciplinary body.226 Judges must remain mindful 
that attorney conduct in violation of the disciplinary rules may give 
rise to entirely different questions than the issues presented in inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims or criminal malpractice actions. In 
other words, attorneys may be found to have rendered constitutional 
representation under Strickland and may be found not to have 
committed malpractice, while at the same time be determined to 
have violated applicable ethical rules. Judges should refer all credible 
allegations of attorney misconduct to the appropriate disciplinary 
body. 
Additionally, trial judges should ensure that a detailed record is 
developed at the trial level describing the behavior of criminal de-
fense lawyers who provide deficient or poor representation that trial 
judges observe firsthand. This is an ideal place for a tactic similar to 
the post-Swain, pre-Batson227 requirement meted out by Illinois 
courts, which required, in order that a record be developed, publica-




malpractice cases unique, and policy considerations require different pleading and substantive 
rules” for criminal malpractice claims). 
 226. See Geimer, supra note 66, at 112 (noting the unfortunate fact that trial judges have 
failed to be recognized as guardians of defense counsel competence). Judicial canons in the 
vast majority of jurisdictions require judges to do so. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT (2000). A version of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct has been adopted in most 
state and federal jurisdictions. 
 227. For recent discussions of the significance of the Batson and Swain decisions, see 
generally Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both Impartial 
and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703,  
 
720–728 (1998); Abbe Smith, “Nice Work if You Can Get It”: “Ethical” Jury Selection in 
Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523 (1998). 
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used its peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks from the jury.228 As 
one court noted: 
[W]e believe that we have an obligation to make it possible for de-
fendants to track the appellate cases where it is alleged that prose-
cutors are systematically excluding blacks from jury service solely 
because of their race, and to make it possible for defendants to 
track the prosecutors who are involved in those cases so that defen-
dants may determine whether the prosecutors are systematically ex-
cluding blacks from juries solely because of their race “in case after 
case.” If this relevant information is not available to defendants, the 
exacting test in Swain becomes illusory for the test could hardly be 
applied, let alone satisfied. 229 
Similarly, to assist in ensuring that criminal defendants receive 
adequate legal representation, courts that witness abysmal criminal 
defense lawyering should “seize the high ground”230 and ensure that 
a record of the lawyer’s conduct is developed. 
Finally, courts should publish all opinions addressing ineffective 
assistance of counsel or criminal malpractice claims. Even when a 
criminal defendant does not prevail in his claim, there is value in de-
nouncing instances of poor lawyering. The legal profession as a 
whole will only benefit when judges and other lawyers in positions of 
prominence evaluate and denounce instances of poor professional 
behavior. Public discussion criticizing poor legal representation, if 
nothing more, puts members of the bar on notice that shoddy repre-
sentation is unacceptable and will be exposed. Even if representation 
cannot be subject to constitutional or civil penalties, reviewing and 
judging it as unacceptable may serve the greater good of improving 
legal professionalism, as it places all members of the bar on notice as 
to what is and is not acceptable while at the same time encouraging 
conscientious members of the bar to strive to do better. 
 
 228. The court stated: 
[W]e believe that when the issue of a prosecutor’s systematic exclusion of citizens 
from jury service solely because of their race is raised, we should not cower but 
rather we should seize the high ground on the issue and discuss it freely and with 
conviction to the end that prosecutors are no longer permitted to systematically ex-
clude citizens from serving on juries solely because of their race, gender or ethnicity. 
 People v. Frazier, 469 N.E.2d 594, 597 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (footnote omitted). 
 229. Id. (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965)) (explaining that the rea-
son for the court enacting this measure is to make up for the shortcomings of the legislature 
failing to do so). 
 230. Id. 
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The adoption of any or all of these proposed measures—
implementing an automatic referral system; abolishing the collateral 
estoppel effect of a Strickland challenge; abolishing the actual inno-
cence requirement; allowing joint filing of Strickland and criminal 
malpractice claims; and encouraging trial judges to document and 
report instances of poor criminal defense lawyering—could initiate 
the transformation of our current system from its present failing state 
to a genuine check on inadequate criminal defense lawyering. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Poor criminal defense lawyering may be described (1) as consti-
tutionally infirm representation,231 (2) as professional negligence232 
(although not necessarily constitutionally infirm conduct), and (3) as 
a violation of applicable ethical or disciplinary rules233 (although not 
necessarily constitutionally infirm representation or professionally 
negligent conduct). Each of these levels has, in theory, mechanisms 
for assessing the conduct of criminal defense attorneys and providing 
such relief as justice may require: (1) an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim,234 (2) a criminal malpractice claim,235 and (3) a disci-
plinary action against the attorney,236 respectively. Although these 
remedies give the appearance of protecting criminal defendants from 
poor lawyering, each remedy is actually illusory. As a result, the cur-
rent system fails to protect criminal defendants, even from egre-
giously inadequate counsel. 
Although Strickland has contributed to this truth, Strickland 
alone is not completely to blame for the shortcomings of the sys-
tem.237 Members of the bar, including the judiciary, need to claim 
 
 231. See supra Part III.A. 
 232. See supra Part III.B. 
 233. See supra Part III.C. 
 234. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 235. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 236. See supra Part III.C. 
 237. See Geimer, supra note 66, at 97 (explaining that although Strickland is not directly 
responsible for the undermining of the right to counsel, its doctrine has played a significant 
part). There are several pre-Strickland opinions that describe the same types of deplorable 
lawyering discussed in this article. See, e.g., United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1970) 
(holding that criminal defendant’s attorney who slept during co-counsel’s examination of wit-
ness did not prevent the defendant from receiving a fair trial and did not fail in his duty of loy-
alty or in elementary skill); Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F.2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941) (finding 
no Sixth Amendment violation despite the fact that criminal defendant’s attorney was drunk 
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responsibility for this problem within our legal system.238 A criminal 
defendant’s rights—the right to the effective assistance of counsel 
and the right to pursue a remedy in the civil courts—ring hollow 
without a system operating to ensure that those rights are well pro-
tected. The participants of the bar, judiciary, and criminal justice sys-
tem should move toward actively improving the quality of legal rep-
resentation for the criminally accused, without regard to a particular 
criminal defendant’s actual innocence or guilt.239 Our current system 
exhibits a lack of commitment to the rights of the criminally accused. 
The system as it currently exists provides little monitoring of the 
criminal defense bar. Left unwatched, there is little incentive or hope 
of improving the quality of criminal defense lawyering. Establishing a 
system that effectively monitors the conduct of criminal defense at-
torneys will improve this portion of the bar. Even minor changes 
could have significant positive effects. 
Beneficial strides can be made toward the goal of improving the 
quality of criminal defense representation by first eliminating the re-
quirement in the majority of jurisdictions that post-conviction relief 
be successfully attained prior to bringing a criminal malpractice 
claim.240 As an alternative, jurisdictions should consider allowing 
 
and asleep at times throughout his trial; court ruled that criminal defendant was not denied the 
right to have effective assistance of competent counsel because he had counsel of his own 
choosing and made no attempt to change his counsel during the representation); United States 
v. Butler, 167 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Va. 1957) (holding that there was no suggestion that crimi-
nal defendant’s morphine addicted attorney’s alleged naps throughout trial was prejudicial to 
defendant). 
 238. See Koniak, supra note 148, at 25 (quoting Strickland in stating that the Sixth 
Amendment relies upon the legal profession’s maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the 
law’s presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Constitu-
tion envisions); Bright, supra note 35, at 1866–69 (asserting that the criminal justice system 
has failed to keep the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright and indicating that although it is the 
constitutional duty of the state to provide counsel to the poor, members of the judiciary and 
the bar have a special responsibility to uphold the rule of law in the face of public outrage and 
revulsion, a responsibility that they often fail to discharge). Although almost no one cares 
about members of society who commit heinous offenses receiving mediocre legal representa-
tion, “this reality does not excuse the constitutional responsibility of the judiciary and members 
of the legal profession to ensure that even the most despised defendants still receive the highest 
quality legal representation in proceedings that will determine whether they live or die.” Id. at 
1878. 
 239. See Bazelon, supra note 125, at 811 (discussing how the “battle for equal justice is 
being lost in the trenches of the criminal courts where the promise of Gideon [v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963),] and Argersinger [v. Hamilin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972),] goes unfulfilled”). 
 240. See supra Part IV.B (proposing the abolition of the collateral estoppel effect of a 
Strickland challenge on a criminal malpractice claim). 
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claimants to file ineffective assistance of counsel claims and criminal 
malpractice claims at the same time.241 Additionally, claims of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel or criminal malpractice should, as a matter 
of routine, trigger some type of review by the appropriate discipli-
nary body.242 The judiciary can assist in efforts toward improving 
criminal defense lawyering by referring questionable lawyering to the 
appropriate disciplinary board while at the same time ensuring that a 
detailed record is developed below.243 Criminal defendants deserve 
no less. After all, criminal defense attorneys represent clients for 
whom our Constitution expressly affords protection.244 “[L]awyers in 
criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”245 
 
 
 241. See supra Part IV.D (suggesting the joint filing of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims and criminal malpractice claims). 
 242. See supra Part IV.A (suggesting the implementation of an automatic referral system). 
 243. See supra Part IV.E (describing the responsibility of judges). 
 244. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
 245. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
